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At the sitting of 15 May 1992 the President of the European Parliament announced 
that he had forwarded the motion for a resolution by Mr Bourlanges and 
Mr Roumeliotis on future relations between the European Community, the WEU and 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of 
Procedure, to the Committee on Institutional Affairs as the committee 
responsible and to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security for its 
opinion. 
At its meeting of 26 February 1992 the committee appointed Mr De Gucht 
rapporteur. 
At its meetings of 27 and 28 April, 9 and 10 June, 28 and 29 June and 7 and 8 
October 1993 and 24 and 25 January 1994 the committee considered the draft 
report. 
At the last meeting it adopted the resolution by 11 votes to 1, with 1 
abstention. 
The following were present for the vote: Gil-Robles Gil-Delgado, chairman; 
Bru Puron, vice-chairman; De Gucht, rapporteur; Alber (for Luster), Boissiere, 
Brand (for Prag), Cheysson, De Giovanni, Ferrer (for Lamana), Froment-Meurice, 
Herman, Marinho and Schodruch. 
The opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security is attached to this 
report. 
The report was tabled on 27 January 1994. 
The deadline for tabling amendments will appear on the draft agenda for the 
part-session at which the report is to be considered . 
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A 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
Resolution on the future relations between the European Union, WEU and the 
Atlantic Alliance 
The European Parliament, 
DOC 
-
having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Bourlanges and 
Mr Roumeliotis on future relations between the European Community, the 
Western European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance (B3-0276/92), 
having regard to its resolution of 10 June 1991 1 , on the outlook for a 
European security policy: the significance of a European security policy 
and its institutional implications for European Political Union 
(A3-0107/91), 
having regard to its resolution of 24 October 1991 2 on the 
intergovernmental conference on a common foreign and security policy 
(B3-1703/91), 
having regard to its resolution of 7 April 19923 on the results of the 
intergovernmental conferences (A3-0123/92), 
having regard to Title V ( "Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy") of the Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht on 7 February 
19924 1 
having regard to the Declaration of the countries that are members of WEU 
and also members of the European Union on "the role of WEU and its 
relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance" and to 
the Declaration of the countries that are members of WEU, signed in 
Maastricht on 7 February 19925 , 
having regard to its resolution of 18 December 19926 on the establishment 
of the European Community's common foreign policy, 
having regard to the report of the WEU Assembly of 6 November 1992, Part 1, 
on "European Union, WEU and the consequences of Maastricht", (Doe. 1342), 
OJ C 183, 15.7.1991, pp. 18-24 
2 OJ C 305, 25.11.1991, pp. 98-99 
3 OJ C 125, 18.5.1992, pp. 81-87 
4 OJ C 224, 31.8.1992 
5 OJ C 224, 31.8.1992 
6 OJ C 211 25.1.1993, pp. 503-508 
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having regard to the final document of the CSCE Summit held on 9 and 10 
July 1992 in Helsinki, signed by 51 countries, setting out fundamental 
guidelines for the prevention and peaceful settlement of conflicts and 
setting up a new CSCE forum for security cooperation, 
having regard to Rule 45 of its Rules of Procedure, 
having regard to the report of the Committee on Institutional Affairs and 
the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security (A3-0041/94), 
A. whereas proposals on the future relationship between the European Union, 
WEU and the Atlantic Alliance need to be based on a thorough analysis of 
the changing European geopolitical landscape and security architecture, 
B. whereas the end of bipolar East-West confrontation has resulted in a 
fundamentally different European geopolitical situation now characterized 
by a proliferation of conflicts and areas of instability; whereas such 
overt or latent conflicts are closely related to economic problems, the 
lack of stable regimes, the rights of minorities and the rise of 
nationalism and religious fanaticism, 
C. whereas the Treaty on European Union establishes a new framework for a 
common foreign and security policy of which the WEU forms an integral part 
by virtue of its inclusion in Article J4 of the Treaty; notes, however, 
that this inclusion is only temporary until such time as the Treaty is 
revised to take into account the progress made and the experience acquired 
by then, 
D. whereas a number of practical questions concerning the relationship between 
the Union and WEU have to be settled for the period before the revision 
planned from 1996 so that the development of the CFSP of the Union can 
proceed smoothly, with democratic superv1s1on and transparency in 
accordance with the objectives of Maastricht, 
E. whereas, especially since 1988, the European Community has further 
developed a European security policy of its own through its support for 
reforms in Central and Eastern Europe and through the adoption during the 
Yugoslav crisis of new instruments in its security policy, but whereas 
these latter developments are still proving insufficient in the absence of 
a framework of precise obligations for the Member States and proper 
democratic supervision of common policy, 
F. whereas the Gulf and Yugoslav crises and the discussions during the IGC on 
European Union emphasized again the existence of different attitudes on the 
part of different EC Member States towards both security and the European 
security architecture, 
Fa. whereas, despite the general failure of the initiatives taken on the 
occasion of the Yugoslav crisis, the European Union is responsible for 
making a strong, united contribution to a new European security 
architecture, 
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G. whereas the Yugoslav and Gulf crises have strengthened the de facto 
relationship between the European Union and WEU, with WEU, in several 
cases, holding meetings immediately after meetings of the European Council 
of Ministers and taking decisions on the basis of guidelines of the 
European Council, 
H. whereas the military crises in the Gulf and in Yugoslavia have again 
underlined the difficulties experienced by WEU in assuming its 
responsibilities, which are the result of its not possessing military 
instruments of its own, of its decision-making process, and especially of 
the refusal of certain Member States to use WEU as an active and 
independent actor, 
I. whereas the Atlantic Alliance has stressed in its declarations the 
importance of strengthening the European pillar and of the increasing role 
of the European Union and WEU with regard to defence and security, 
J. whereas Franco-German military cooperation, since the La Rochelle meeting 
in May 1992, has assumed a potentially more European dimension, firstly, 
as France and Germany have decided to create a military corps with a 
European vocation, with other WEU countries being invited to join, enabling 
the Member States to take their responsibilities in the framework of the 
European Union, and secondly, as Belgium has decided in June 1993 to 
participate as an equal partner in this Eurocorps, 
K. whereas de facto the role of the UN has increased as an organization that 
can intervene with peace-keeping forces of its own as well as legitimize 
actions, including even the use of force against aggressors in a conflict, 
I. The European security architecture and the new challenges. 
1 . States its conviction that the fundamentally different European 
geopolitical landscape requires a set of instruments of security policy; 
2. Considers that this new set of instruments implies, firstly, a 
restructuring of military forces enabling them to fulfil new tasks and, 
secondly, a greater emphasis on the non-military dimension (such as 
economic relations and measures, environmental protection, financial aid, 
diplomatic initiatives, support for the respect of human rights); 
3. Stresses that future security policy should treat the closely inter-related 
military and non-military aspects in a coherent way and that, in order to 
be successful, such efforts require an efficient institutional framework 
that can swiftly take decisions on both military and non-military aspects 
of security; 
4. Regards the procedures on a Common Foreign and Security Policy adopted in 
and since the "Treaty on European Union" as positive but insufficient 
steps; welcomes the fact that it provides a basis for the further 
development of both the non-military and military dimensions in the Union's 
security and defence policy; 
5. Notes that under TEU Article J.4(1) CFSP shall from the outset include all 
questions related to the security of the· Union, even though the 
establishment of a common defence policy will be subject of a longer-term 
development; 
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6. Notes that a dual structure is maintained in the Treaty on European Union, 
that the objectives of the Union are not formulated in a more binding way, 
that the possibility of using majority voting is very limited, that the EP 
and the Commission are not more involved, and that the political 
predominance of the Union over WEU is not formulated more clearly; 
7. Sees the WEU Declaration adopted in Maastricht on 10 December 1991, and 
especially the "Petersberg Declaration" adopted by WEU on 19 June 1992, as 
important (though insufficient) steps towards the new task of WEU as the 
defence instrument of the Union and towards extending its operational 
possibilities; 
8. Points out that WEU from now on has to develop from a protective alliance 
of its member states into a European security instrument through the 
Maastricht decisions and the subsequent decisions of WEU; 
9. States its conviction that the Eurocorps, including French, German and 
Belgian forces, must be integrated within WEU and the European Union as 
much as possible; 
10. Emphasizes the need to find procedures to prevent existing differences in 
opinion among the Member States blocking any progress in the fields of 
security and defence; calls, therefore, for a cautious approach to be 
adopted as regards the application of Article J.3(2) of the TEU; 
II. The need for a coherent single institutional framework 
11. Recognizes the need to define a long-term view and short- and medium-term 
measures to overcome the different attitudes of the Member States about the 
scope of European external, security and defence policy and structure as 
well as the pace to follow for developing them; 
12. Emphasizes the importance of a coherent single institutional framework in 
view of, firstly, the coherence required by the Treaty on European Union 
and, secondly, the demands of the new security situation, which call for 
coherence between all aspects (military and non-military) of security 
policy, and, thirdly, the transparency and clarity of institutional 
structures necessary for public understanding and democratic control; 
13. States its conviction that this basic principle of a coherent single 
institutional framework implies for the European Union that majority voting 
be more widely used in the field of external, security and defence policy, 
that one single uniform administrative structure be established, that the 
EP gain for itself alone the authority to exert democratic control over all 
aspects of this policy and that the Commission gets a larger role; 
14. Welcomes the fact that all European Union Member States belong to the WEU 
either as full members (including Greece), or as observers (Denmark and 
Ireland), and emphasizes that the basic principle of a coherent single 
institutional framework also implies that the primacy of the European Union 
over WEU be confirmed unambiguously, with the European Union taking the 
political decisions concerning security and defence, with WEU implementing 
the decisions which have defence implications, and with WEU being 
incorporated within the European Union by 1998 when the period of fifty 
years mentioned in Article XII of the Modified Treaty of Brussels comes to 
an end; 
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14a. Expects associate members and states with observer status at the WEU to 
respect international law and UN resolutions and refrain from acts or 
omissions inconsistent with the legitimate rights and concerns of WEU 
members so as not to jeopardize the community spirit and functioning of the 
WEU; 
• 15. Takes the view that this basic principle also implies that all aspects of ' 
the relationship with the United States should come under the 
responsibility of the same political authority, which implies that the 
European Union should become responsible for defining the European position 
in the Atlantic Alliance; considers that this will allow the development 
of a more consistent attitude towards the United States as well as a less 
ambiguous relationship between the Union and the USA; 
III. The EU-WEU relationship and the institutional consequences of the putting 
into place of a coherent single institutional framework 
16. Recognizes that the putting into place of a coherent single institutional 
framework for the external, security and defence policy of the Union 
requires a gradual approach in several stages; 
17. Takes the view that: 
in a first stage, the Union should put order in its own institutional 
set-up, bearing in mind that WEU is already part of the Union as from 
now; 
in a following stage, the institutions of both the Union and WEU should 
define precisely their integrated relationship and merge at a practical 
level; 
in the final stage, as a result of a new IGC and the end of the period 
of 50 years mentioned in Article XII of the Modified Treaty of Brussels, 
the Union should fully incorporate WEU, taking full responsibility for 
external, security and defence policy as well as for the relations with 
the Atlantic Alliance; 
18. Believes, therefore, that the institutions and procedures of CFSP should 
be developed on the basis of the following principles: 
19. With regard to the Council 
the Council, composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of 
Defence, should make all the political decisions on security and defence 
on the basis of the overall guidelines defined by the European Council, 
with the WEU Council (which should meet immediately after the Union 
Council meetings) being asked to implement the military aspects of these 
decisions and with the European Commission being asked to implement the 
other aspects; 
representatives of the WEU Council sh,ould be regularly invited to report 
on its activities to the committee of the European Parliament 
responsible for security and defence matters; 
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the Council should take as much as possible its decisions by qualified 
majority votes; the Political Committee provided for in Article J.8(5) 
of the Treaty on European Union will have to merge in practice with 
COREPER during this phase so as to be incorporated finally into COREPER 
in the following phase; 
in a following stage the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence should 
meet at the same time as the Union Council and the WEU Council, with the 
use of qualified majority voting becoming common practice for external, 
security and defence policy, taking into account the specific nature of 
this policy area 
in the final stage, the Council should - according the conditions 
defined by the IGC referred to in paragraph 17, third indent, above -
take full responsibility for external, security and defence policy; 
20. With regard to the European Parliament: 
the European Parliament should draw up its own proposals on security and 
defence policy and scrutinize the relevant decisions of the WEU Council. 
the European Parliament may address questions and recommendations to the 
WEU Council; 
the directly-elected European Parliament should scrutinize the decisions 
and actions under CFSP not only vis-a-vis the Council in the context of 
Article J.7 but also vis-a-vis the Commission, and should use all the 
instruments conferred on it by the Treaties; 
the EP's Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security and the WEU 
committees should intensify their cooperation and the EP should 
establish a full Committee on Security and Defence; 
in a second stage, the EP and the WEU Assembly should hold joint 
sessions, with their competent committees holding meeting 
simultaneously; 
the EP's rights of superv1s1on should be further developed and become 
comparable to those available to national parliaments with respect to 
national security policy; 
the EP should adopt procedures to allow the Committee on Security and 
Defence or its Bureau to meet without delay in case of sudden 
international crises, to have consultations with representatives of the 
Council and Commission, and to make recommendations to the Council; 
the provisions of the TEU on the assent of the EP for international 
agreements should be broadly interpreted; 
in a third stage, the EP should replace entirely the WEU Assembly at 
plenary and committee level, the powers and voting conditions of the EP 
being defined by the IGC referred to in paragraph 17, third indent, 
above; 
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its assent by absolute majority of its members should be required for 
fundamental decisions on external policy, security and defence (and 
especially on military intervention), and be extended to the conclusion 
of agreements between the Union and third countries or international 
organizations on disarmament and arms control as well as to defence 
agreements in which the Union is involved; 
given that security and defence will continue to grow in importance as 
a subject to which the European Union must address itself, the European 
Parliament should be equipped with adequate administrative support to 
deal with these matters; 
21. With regard to the European Commission 
the Commission, and especially its new Commissioner assigned to the CFSP 
field, should further develop its contribution to the Union's CFSP, in 
view of the autonomous eo-responsibility of the Commission for CFSP 
based on its right of initiative (Article J.8(3)), its full 
participation in the work connected with CFSP (Article J. 9) , its 
responsibility for the consistency of the Union's external activities 
as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic 
and development policies (Article C) , and the participation of the 
Commission President in the European Council, (Article D); 
a DG for External Affairs and Security should be created and should 
gradually develop a close and trusting cooperation with the foreign 
affairs departments of the Member States as well as a working 
relationship with the WEU agencies to allow increased coherence between 
all aspects of security; 
the competent EC Commissioner and the Secretary General of WEU as well 
as the DG for External Affairs and Security and the WEU Secretariat-
General should work even more closely together; 
ultimately, and according to the conditions defined by the IGC referred 
to in paragraph 17, third indent, above, the competent EC Commissioner 
assumes the powers of the WEU Secretary General, with the WEU 
Secretariat-General being incorporated within the Commission's DG for 
External Relations and Security, which should be renamed the 
Directorate-General for External Relations, Security and Defence; 
22. Is aware that, with regard to security and defence, a gradual and 
differentiated development should be adopted, as is allowed by the 
possibility of non-participation in the-implementation of joint actions for 
any Member State (Article J.3(7)) and the reference to the special nature 
of the security and defence policies of certain Member States (Article 
J.4(4)); calls on the Union nevertheless to retain the greatest possible 
unity in CFSP questions, a unity to which all the Member States have 
committed themselves under Article J.2(2) according to which each Member 
State has to ensure that national policies conform to the common positions; 
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23. Foresees therefore: 
the solution chosen for the EMU in Maastricht is adopted, with all 
Member States accepting the objectives and principles, but with some 
Member States preferring not to participate from the outset; 
24. Points out that the participating Member States, under certain conditions 
and following prior deliberation in the Council, may choose, owing to major 
difficulties that are commonly acknowledged, not to participate in certain 
decisions or in the implementation of certain decisions, not preventing the 
other Member States from making decisions and properly implementing them 
(opting-out clause); 
25. Emphasizes that the final objective should be to have all Member States 
participating fully in the Union's external, security and defence policy; 
IV. The relationship with the Atlantic Alliance 
26. Notes that, as WEU has to implement the political decisions of the European 
Union which have defence implications, it has to further strengthen its 
operational capabilities to enable it in time to act, if necessary, 
independently from NATO after consultation with the NATO allies; 
27. Observes that the required operational independence of WEU implies that it 
has to be able to rely on its own military forces and that it must dispose 
of its own transport facilities (principally aircraft), observation 
facilities (particularly by satellite), research, information and planning 
facilities and command structures; believes, however, that in a first 
period this should be pursued in cooperation with NATO, through the 
development of a combined military command structure and of a double-
hatting formula; considers, however, that a European security entity should 
not necessarily duplicate all NATO capabilities; 
28. Takes the view that WEU, as it strengthens and supports the European pillar 
of the Atlantic Alliance, increasingly has to introduce joint positions 
into the process of consultation in the Atlantic Alliance on the basis of 
the political options adopted within the European Union; 
29. Believes that the Union should take into account the policy laid down in 
the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty and that, if possible and 
appropriate, the European countries should make their decisions and act in 
the field of defence within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, but 
that if consensus cannot be found within the Alliance, the European Member 
States should be able to take decisions and actions within the Union's 
Council; 
30. Considers it useful that a division of labour be adopted between the 
Atlantic Alliance and the Union, and that different categories of actions 
be defined, with some actions being under the exclusive authority of the 
Alliance, some under the exclusive authority of the Union, and other 
actions under their concurrent responsibility; 
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31. Considers it important that ultimately, together with the rev1s1on of the 
Treaties leading to the full incorporation of WEU in the European Union, 
the existing North Atlantic Treaty is adapted or a new treaty signed 
between the USA and the European Union to reflect better the new equal 
relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic; 
V. The involvement of European non-Union cormtries 
32. Repeats its request that it should be open to certain states with which the 
Community has concluded Europe Agreements to take on association with the 
Union in order to give them appropriate participation in the operation of 
CFSP; 
33. States its conviction that the involvement of European non-Union countries 
has to be stimulated as this may have a significant stabilizing impact on 
the European security situation; suggest that these countries can be 
invited to participate in the implementation of the decisions taken by this 
Council; 
34. Considers that the EC can pursue closer security and defence cooperation 
with other European states through common participation in the CSCE; 
believes that procedures to facilitate this cooperation within CSCE have 
to be elaborated; stresses its demand that the Union must become a 
participant in CSCE with full rights also in questions of security policy; 
35. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the 
Commission, the Member States, the WEU, NATO, the CSCE, and the member 
states of the CSCE. 
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B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
THE FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
WEU AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. 
Proposals on the future relationship between the European Union, WEU and the 
Atlantic Alliance need to be based on a thorough analysis of the changing 
European geopolitical landscape and security architecture. This will provide 
us a better view on how this relationship could be developed in the future. 
I. "LES OONNEES POLITIOUES" 
A. The changing European geooolitical landscape 
Resume: 
The fundamentally different threats that characterize the new European 
geopolitical landscape imply the use of a fundamentally different set of 
instruments in our security policy and, consequently, the involvement of a 
different mixture of international organizations. 
1. Changing threats, conflicts and potential crises 
(a) the end of the old European order 
Both Western security policy and the Western defence policy were shaped during 
the forty years after World War II by the specific features which the European 
geopolitical landscape assumed during this period. 
The predominance of the east-west conflict, the clearly defined and very strict 
east-west division of Europe and Germany, the impossibility of any constructive 
relationship between two fundamentally opposed blocks, and the militarization 
of this east-west conflict determined during more than 40 years the shape of the 
security policy of the West. This security policy was predominantly directed 
against the Warsaw Pact. It was largely confined to military measures, this 
means to the defence policy. The non-military aspects of security policy (e.g. 
political and economic contacts and measures, support for the respect of human 
rights) were barely taken into account. 
Defence policy was determined by the presence on the European continent of the 
USSR as a nuclear superpower, by the clearly defined frontline and by the fear 
of a surprise attack by superior conventional Warsaw Pact forces. It was 
characterized by a heavy reliance on nuclear deterrence, a concentration of 
military forces in West Germany, and the leadership of the USA as nuclear 
superpower in the Atlantic Alliance. 
The east-west conflict and the presence on the international scene of the two 
superpowers also had stabilizing effects as they prevented the outbreak of 
potential conflicts. 
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The developments in Europe since 1987 has created a fundamentally different 
European geopolitical situation, as we have witnessed the end of the east-west 
conflict and division, the disappearance of the communist regimes in Europe and 
of the USSR, the end of the arms race, the end of a clearly defined frontline 
and the fading away of fear of a Warsaw Pact offensive. The east-west crisis 
and the related threats which characterized for four decades European history 
have thus disappeared. 
(b) the new threats 
In the new European geopolitical landscape we are no more confronted with the 
stabilizing antagonism between two clearly defined blocks, but with a 
proliferation of geographically spread latent and manifest crises, conflicts and 
areas of instability which though not directed immediately against us, in the 
long run could undermine our security. There are conflicts among Central and 
East European countries and former Soviet republics, civil wars within these 
states, and threatening actions from non-democratic countries outside Europe. 
Hence, a multitude of countries, regions and people are in a position to become 
involved in a complex variety of both antagonistic relationships and ad hoc 
alliances and coalitions. The European security landscape has become rather 
chaotic. 
The character of these latent and overt crises, conflicts and areas of 
instability implies that there is no longer one single, clearly defined 
frontline, but a multitude of potential frontlines and a multitude of conflicts 
where it is impossible to draw the potential frontline. 
The situation is further complicated by the fact that the latent and overt 
crises, conflicts and areas of instability are closely related to economic 
problems, the lack of stable and democratic regimes, ethnic problems, the rise 
of nationalism and religious fundamentalism, and the fading away of integrating 
and controlling forces and of international organizations in these regions. The 
new challenges are no longer confined to traditional political and military 
aspects, but are related to fundamental changes in society and history. 
Some old threats remain, even though they assume at present another form and 
have to be considered in a different context. These threats are related to the 
nuclear forces of the "new" nuclear powers in the former Soviet-republics and 
to the fact that Russia will remain a strong - also military - power despite the 
present difficulties. The security problems posed by the situation on the 
southern and south-eastern flank of Europe have also considerably increased. 
2. Changing instruments of a European security policy 
(a) the need for b9th military and non-military measures 
The characteristics of this fundamentally different European geopolitical 
landscape imply that a fundamentally different set of instruments has to be used 
in our security policy. This means first, that the non-military dimension 
should receive a greater weight within security policy and, second, that the 
military dimension as such should also be thoroughly re-examined. Future 
security policy should make sure that military and non-military aspects are 
treated in a coherent way, which is essential in view of their very close 
interrelationship. 
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(b) military forces of a different kind 
The nature of military conflicts in which we can now become involved requires 
a fundamentally different kind of military forces. These forces should be able 
to intervene in very different and unfamiliar environments and circumstances, 
and more emphasis should be given to mobility, readiness, adapted military 
equipment, and specialized and well trained military personnel. More attention 
will have to be given to the flanks of the European subcontinent. 
Whereas deterrence and defence against a massive surprise attack were the 
central tasks in the past, future military forces will have to be able to 
control truces, to act as a buffer between fighting parties (after a military 
conflict, or to prevent a conflict), to intervene in a military conflict between 
several fighting parties, to intervene to drive back an aggressor. 
Confidence building measures accepted within the Helsinki process should be 
further developed and introduced in the relationship between all countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe and in the former USSR. 
The existence of Rapid Intervention Forces and a willingness obvious to 
everyone, to deploy these troops in areas of crisis will become the main 
instrument of conventional deterrence needed in the new European geopolitical 
situation. This conventional deterrence will increase the reluctance of 
antagonistic groups to resort to military force to solve a conflict. It will 
also give more weight to negotiations, warnings and sanctions from international 
organizations if it is known that this organization is able and willing, as a 
last resort, to use its Rapid Intervention Forces. 
Nuclear deterrence is still needed too in view of the rema1n1ng nuclear power 
of Russia and other republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
The position of Russia also implies that the possibility of an American military 
involvement remains important both as instrument of deterrence and as military 
instrument of last resort. Initially, US involvement will also remain necessary 
for reasons of strategic transport, logistics, strategic intelligence and air 
support. 
This does not imply that a considerable presence of American troops in Europe 
is still needed. Efficient procedures and an adapted infrastructure are however 
required to assure the possibility of rapid military intervention by the 
Americans on European territory. This emphasizes the importance of a 
restructuring of the Atlantic Alliance. 
(c) the non-military dimension of a security policy 
The fact that a large part of the new challenges concern non-military problems 
(which however can take a military dimension), that the relationship with the 
countries involved in potential conflicts is not limited to an antagonistic 
military relationship and that we are in most cases not immediately involved in 
the potential conflicts, implies that there is a greater opportunity to use non-
military instruments of security policy. 
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This non-military dimension includes economic relations and measures (sanctions 
or support), financial support, political relations, diplomatic initiatives, 
personal and cultural contacts, support for the respect of human rights, 
providing accurate information, mediation, etc. It implies that a security 
policy can no longer be largely based on what are largely unilateral decisions 
that effect these countries, but that cooperation with the countries concerned 
has to be pursued as much as possible. 
The efficient and timely use of the whole spectrum of non-military aspects of 
security policy will help to put an end to a - military or non-military -
conflict, to prevent in the short term the start of a military conflict, to 
remove in the long term the causes of potentially dangerous tensions between or 
within countries, to counter and influence potentially dangerous regimes, and 
to prevent the rise of such new regimes in and outside Europe. 
(d) the changing "time"-factor 
The non-military dimension of a security policy and the importance of pre-
emptive military interventions call for a proactive and empathetic attitude 
rather than for the present reactive policy. This requires a more dynamic and 
creative attitude on the part of decision-makers and more attention to and 
better information on and analysis of the situation in the countries in 
potentially instable regions. 
This emphasizes the importance of being able to rely on both efficient and swift 
decision-making processes and on an adapted non-military and military 
infrastructure and set of instruments. 
(e) budgetary implications 
Both the restructuring of military forces for their new tasks and objectives and 
the greater weight of the non-military dimension in security policy require a 
reallocation of financial resources. The greater importance of the non-military 
dimension implies a budgetary effort for security which will be at least as 
important as what the West has spent on defence in the past, even if the budget 
for defence will diminish. However, in contrast with the past, these financial 
resources will have to be used for more constructive and productive security 
efforts. The greater (budgetary) importance of the non-military dimension also 
implies that the debate on burden sharing will have to be tackled in a different 
way. 
3. Consequences for the European security architecture 
A first consequence of both the changing threats, conflicts and potential crises 
and the changing instruments of European security policy is the need for an 
institutional framework that can assure the coherence between both the military 
and non-military aspects of security policy. This implies that the past 
situation, in which decisions on military measures and non-military measures 
were treated independently, and in which there were specific organizations for 
both aspects of security, is no longer adequate. 
DOC_EN\RR\244\244915 - 16 - PE 202.482/fin. 
A solution must be found, either through an organization that becomes competent 
for both the military and non-military dimensions of security or through a very 
close cooperation between different organizations. To guarantee the necessary 
coherence, however, it is essential that there is only one political entity 
responsible for both aspects of security, even if the implementation is in the 
hands of different organizations. 
A second consequence of both the old threats to a large extent disappearing and 
of the nature of the new threats, is that the necessity for the United States 
to be involved in guaranteeing our security will diminish considerably. The 
remaining security problems, which are mainly related to the nuclear forces of 
especially Russia, can to a large extent be tackled in the bilateral 
relationship between the USA and Russia. The changing security situation for 
the USA, together with the pressure to pay more attention to internal problems, 
will further enhance the pressure to diminish the American financial and 
military contribution to our security. 
This move towards increasing political and military disengagement of the USA and 
towards an increasing Europeanization of our security policy does however not 
imply that Washington will not continue to try and influence the developments 
within Europe and especially the decisions and actions of its European partners. 
This implies that the European countries will have to take, more than before, 
their political and financial responsibility to guarantee their security and to 
decide themselves about the military as well as non-military dimension of our 
security policy. 
Thirdly, diminishing American involvement implies too that American leadership 
will fade further away together with the cohesion in analysis and policy of the 
Western partners which was to a considerable degree assured by this leadership. 
This cohesion also threatens to decline as a result of the disappearing of the 
overriding threat and the rise of a multitude of different latent and overt 
conflicts and potential ad hoc alliances. 
The different European countries may increasingly perceive this ambivalent 
European security situation in a different manner, set different priorities and 
propose different solutions. In short, there is a danger of an increasing 
reflex to behave as nations have always done, that is to listen to their 
national interests, and seek like-minded partners. 
This danger points to the importance of having a European centre of analysis and 
to strengthen the process of political integration to be able to counter the 
development of different national responses to the present European geopolitical 
situation. 
A fourth consequence of the new potential threats is that the Central and East 
European countries and the former Soviet republics will have to be involved in 
the new European security architecture if the new European security policy is 
to be effective. This implies a certain pan-Europeanization of Western and 
Western European organizations and institutions or the creation of new pan-
European structures. 
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B. The changing European Security Architecture 
The fundamental developments within Europe since 198 7 resulted in gradual 
changes in the European security architecture. These changes already point to 
a gradual move towards the prudent tendency towards both a Europeanization and 
pan-Europeanization of the European security structure and an increasing linkage 
between the military and non-military dimension of security policy. This move 
is however slow and gradual when compared with the fundamental and far-reaching 
changes in the European security situation. 
A short overview of these tendencies is given in the following paragraphs. 
1 . The European Union 
Especially since 1988, the European Community has played a considerable part in 
the developing European security situation through its support for economic and 
political reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. The "European Agreements" 
which were concluded with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and the 
negotiations on association and other agreements with the other countries in the 
region further increase the influence of the Community. The extent to which the 
Community accepts to strengthen contacts with these countries depends on their 
fulfilling of several stabilizing conditions. The Association Agreements and 
the perspective of possible membership to the European Union also gives these 
states a wider political scope and has a stabilizing influence. 
The European Union does also apply several criteria for the recognition of new 
states: the acceptance of the rule of law and the principles of democracy, 
guarantees of the rights of minorities and ethnic groups, respect for each 
other's frontiers and observance of existing commitments to disarmament and 
regional security. These so called Badinter-principles, which are aimed at 
stabilizing the European security situation, oblige the republics or people 
concerned to adapt if necessary their position. 
The Union has managed to substantially develop the non-military dimension of 
security policy. However, the crisis in Yugoslavia showed that the influence 
of the European Community is often too limited as it cannot back its security 
policy, confined to non-military aspects, with military means. Nevertheless, 
the crisis in Yugoslavia also indicated a positive development in the security 
policy of the Union. 
Remarkably, it was the European Union, and not NATO, WEU or CSCE, which assumed 
its responsibilities and which became involved as an external power in the 
military crisis in Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the Union employed new instruments 
in its security policy. The Twelve mediated in the conflict and initiated a 
peace conference in The Hague, they negotiated to achieve ceasefires, and sent 
observers to the disputed area to monitor the ceasefire agreements. 
The crisis in Yugoslavia, just as the Gulf crisis, strengthened the inter-
relationship between the Union and WEU, with the latter holding meetings 
immediately after meetings of the EC Council of Ministers (with non-WEU 
countries Denmark and Greece participating in these WEU meetings) and with WEU 
de facto taking decisions on the basis of guidelines provided by the EC. 
DOC_EN\RR\244\244915 - 18 - PE 202.482/fin. 
As will be analysed in the next chapter, new measures were accepted in the 
"Treaty on European Union", adopted by the European Council in Maastricht in 
December 1991, to develop the military dimension of the security policy of the 
Union. 
The "Report on the likely development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) with a view to identifying areas open to joint action vis-a-vis 
particular countries or groups of countries", accepted in June 1992 by the 
European Council in Lisbon further elaborates the Maastricht decisions. It 
mentions that the CFSP should contribute to ensuring that the Union's external 
action is less reactive, and should enable the Union to tackle problems at their 
roots in order to anticipate the outbreak of crises. This also appears from the 
examples of the Union's foreign policy objectives, which however also include 
"contributing to the prevention and settlement of conflicts". 
2. NATO 
Within the Atlantic Alliance there have been some moves towards a gradual 
Europeanization. First of all, the important "Rome Declaration on Peace and 
Cooperation" and "New Strategic Concept" issued at the NATO-summit in Rome in 
November 1991 emphasized the importance of the strengthening of the European 
pillar and of the increasing role of the European Union and WEU with regard to 
defence and security. 
The Rome Declaration asserts that "the development of a European security 
identity and defence role, reflected in the further strengthening of the 
European pillar within the Alliance, will reinforce the integrity and 
effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance .... Recognizing that it is for the 
European Allies concerned to decide what arrangements are needed for the 
expression of a common European foreign and security policy and defence role, 
we further agree that ... we will develop practical arrangements to ensure the 
necessary transparency and complementarity between the European security and 
defence identity as it emerges in the Twelve and the WEU, and the Alliance .... 
We welcome the perspective of a reinforcement of the role of the WEU, both as 
the defence component of the process of European unification and as a means of 
strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance ... ". 
It is however not at all clear to what extent the United States and some 
European NATO countries will allow this European pillar to become more than an 
appendix to NATO and to gain some degree of independence. 
A second sign of the tendency towards a Europeanization of NATO was the creation 
within the NATO framework of an Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, which consists of 
four divisions from European NATO member states under the leadership of the 
United Kingdom. NATO can decide to put parts of this corps under WEU command. 
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The need to establish relations with the Central and Eastern European countries 
led to the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in December 1991 
which includes the NATO countries, the former Warsaw Pact countries and the 
former Soviet republics. Another important decision with regard to the 
development of a pan-Europeanization of our security structure was the decision 
of the North Atlantic Council on 4 June 1992 in Oslo that it be "prepared to 
support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our own procedures, 
peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE". This implies 
that the Alliance might also intervene outside the traditional NATO area. This, 
however, requires that the CSCE asks NATO to do so and that no NATO member state 
is opposed to such action. 
The Atlantic Alliance has also tried to assume a more than military role, and 
especially, to strengthen the political role of the Alliance. This means that 
the Alliance also emphasizes more than before the linkage between the military 
and non-military dimensions of security. The outcome to date of these attempts 
however also show clearly the limitations of the Alliance. 
3. WEU 
As the Europeanization of the Western security structure was considered 
essential, both NATO and the European Union saw WEU as a useful organization to 
obtain this aim and to assert their competence in the field of security and 
defence. In this context WEU was more an object than a subject in the 
discussions about the future European security architecture. 
Moreover, the Gulf crisis and the crisis in Yugoslavia again emphasized the 
inability of WEU to assume its responsibilities and this is the result of not 
having its own military instruments and especially of the refusal of certain 
member states to use WEU as an active and independent actor in Europe. Its 
predominantly military approach to security problems further diminishes WEU's 
ability to act on its own as an important player in the field of security. 
The Declaration of the countries which are members of the WEU and the European 
Union on "The role of the WEU and its relations with the European Union and with 
the Atlantic Alliance" which was issued together with the Treaty on European 
Union at the Maastricht Summit in December 1991 clarifies to some extent the 
position of WEU. The declared objectives are to build up WEU as the defence 
component of the European Union and to develop WEU as a means to strengthen the 
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. It was also accepted that WEU' s 
operational role would be strengthened. 
In the "Petersberg Declaration" adopted during their meeting in Bonn, 19 June, 
1992, the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the WEU countries decided to create 
a military force that can intervene at the request of the CSCE or of the 
Security Council of the United Nations. It was, however, not indicated that WEU 
can also intervene on the request of the European Union. The declaration also 
states that WEU forces can be used for humanitarian missions, for peace keeping 
operations and for conflict management actions, included operations to re-
establish peace. 
The different declarations emphasize the remaining ambiguity concerning the 
position of WEU vis-a-vis the EC, NATO, CSCE and the UN. 
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With regard to WEU it is important to mention Article XII of the treaty 
establishing WEU: the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and 
Collective Self-Defence, signed in Brussels on March 17, 1948, as amended by the 
Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty. This article of this 
Modified Brussels Treaty notes that "[the present Treaty] shall enter into force 
on the date of the deposit of the last instrument of ratification and shall 
thereafter remain in force for fifty years" and that "after the expiry of the 
period of fifty years, each of the High Contracting Parties shall have the right 
to cease to be a party thereto ... ". 
This "period of fifty years" refers to the period from 1948 on when the original 
Brussels Treaty was signed and ratified, and not to the period from 1954/55 on, 
considering the fact that in 1954/55 no new treaty was signed and ratified but 
only a "Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty". This also 
implies that 1998 is an appropriate year to accomplish a process of 
restructuring and rationalizing the European security structure. 
4. Franco-German relationship 
Franco-German military cooperation has assumed since May 1992 a potentially more 
European dimension: France and Germany decided during their La Rochelle meeting 
to create a military corps with a European vocation, and other WEU countries are 
invited to join. This European corps should contribute to give the European 
Union its own military capacities and show the will of the participating 
countries to assume their responsibilities concerning security and the 
preservation of peace in the framework of the European Union including the 
eventual framing of a common defence policy. The European corps is also 
considered contributing to the strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance. 
The European corps can be used for the common defence of the NATO and WEU 
allies, for humanitarian and peace keeping missions and for the reinforcement 
of peace. 
The relationship of this Eurocorps vis-a-vis the different organizations is 
still unclear. The same is true for the participation of the other WEU 
countries. Countries such as Spain and Luxemburg have already shown their 
interest whereas other countries such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands 
have reacted rather negatively. Belgium, however, has just joined. 
5. CSCE 
Since the successful conclusion of the Follow-up Conference of Vienna in January 
1989 and especially since the end of the east-west conflict, the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe has been able to assume a new role as it 
finally could be used as an instrument to genuinely strengthen the relations 
between all European countries. 
The new start was formalized by the Charter of Paris for a New Europe which was 
accepted by all CSCE countries during the November 1990 Paris Summit. The 
Charter of Paris also provided for the creation of a Conflict Prevention Centre 
in Vienna, which has the aim of reducing the risk of conflict by promoting 
openness and transparency in military matters. 
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The CSCE seems to have been used more and more as a legitimizing factor for 
action taken by other organizations, as was the case when the EC sent observers 
to Yugoslavia with the support of the CSCE. The crisis in Yugoslavia however 
has also indicated that the CSCE and the Conflict Prevention Center are not yet 
able to intervene efficiently in such a crisis. The large number of member 
states (now including the former Soviet republics), its intergovernmental 
character and the lack of an executive branch of its own undermine the 
possibilities of the CSCE. 
However, through its competences in both the military and non-military dimension 
of security, the CSCE remains a valuable organization, the influence of which 
can increase further if the CSCE were to be declared a regional arrangement 
under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. 
6. The United Nations 
As a result of the crises in the Gulf, in Yugoslavia and in some former Soviet 
republics the role of the United Nations has been increased, both as the 
international organization that can legitimize and decide on action, including 
even the use of violence against aggressors in a conflict and as the 
organization that can send peace-keeping forces of its own. 
7. Different attitudes of the EU Member States towards security and towards the 
European security architecture 
The Gulf crisis, the crisis in Yugoslavia and the discussions during the 
Intergovernmental Conference on European Union emphasized again the existence 
of different attitude of different EU Member States towards both security and 
the European security architecture. 
The EU countries have different ideas on the nature of threats and potential 
crises and on the nature of security. This also results in different opinions 
on the way to counter these threats and potential crises with regard to the 
combination of the military and non-military instruments of security policy. 
This obviously also has consequences for the choice of the (set of) 
organizations that are considered as most useful to implement security policy. 
This choice is also determined by other factors, such as traditional policy and 
the special relationships that certain countries enjoy. 
The development of a European security policy and identity will require that 
procedures are found to align these sometimes fundamentally different views on 
European security and on the European security situation, that methods are 
devised to prevent the differences blocking any progress in this field. 
8. Conclusion 
No single organization is able to cope on its own with all the problems. A 
network of different institutions is thus necessary in view of the different 
nature of the threats and the different instruments required. However, there 
need to be one single political authority to assure the requisite coherence. 
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II. THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION AND THE WEU DECLARATION. 
1. New objectives 
The Treaty on European Union that was adopted by the European Council in 
Maastricht in December 1991 extends substantially the objectives of the European 
Union concerning external relations and defence. 
Article B of Title I ("Common Provisions") gives as one of the five objectives 
"to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the 
implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual 
framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common 
defence". 
Article J.1 of Title V ("Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy") 
mentions that "The Union and its Member States shall define and implement a 
common foreign and security policy . . . covering all areas of foreign and 
security policy. The objectives of the common foreign and security policy shall 
be: 
- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the 
Union; 
- to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways; 
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with 
the principles of the UN Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final 
Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter; 
- to promote international co-operation; 
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms". 
The objectives are much more far-reaching and specific than in the Treaty of 
Rome or the Single European Act. "Shall define and implement" is indeed more 
binding than "shall endeavour jointly to formulate and implement" as it was 
formulated in the Single European Act. 
Whereas this obligation in the Single European Act was confined to "a European 
foreign policy", the Treaty on European Union also does refer to a common 
security policy. The provisions on the objectives provide a basis for the 
development of all - this means both the military and non-military - dimensions 
of the Union's security policy. 
These objectives and the explicit mentioning of the defence aspect are an 
important development in view of the traditionally reluctant position of several 
Member States vis-a-vis defence and in view of the neutrality of Ireland. 
2. The need for consistency and for a single institutional framework 
The decision-making process provided for in Title V concerning the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy is different from the procedures foreseen in the 
other Titles of the Treaty on European Union. The different institutions do not 
have the same responsibilities in the Common Foreign and Security Policy as is 
the case in the other policy areas of the Union; and the Treaty on European 
Union therefore from an institutional point of view does not differ 
fundamentally from the Single European Act. The dual system with on the one 
hand the European Community (and its external policy) and on the other hand the 
Foreign and Security Policy thus remains in existence. 
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However, the Treaty emphasizes the need for unity and coherence between the 
common foreign and security policy and the other policies of the Union, both 
institutionally and for what concerns the contents of these policies. 
Article C of Title I ( 11 Common Provisions 11 ) mentions that 11The Union shall be 
served by a single institutional framework which shall ensure the consistency 
and the continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain its 
objectives. . . The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its 
external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, 
security, economic and development policies. The Council and the Commission 
shall be responsible for ensuring such consistency11 • The emphasis on 11all 
areas .. of foreign and security policy (Art. J1/1) also points to this required 
consistency. 
Institutionally, there is an improvement as the Council is now also responsible 
for all issues concerning the Common External and Security Policy. There are 
thus no more special meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member 
States, as was still the case in the Single European Act. Negative, however, 
is the fact that this merger was not put through on a lower level. The EPC's 
Political Committee consisting of Political Directors will continue to function 
besides the EC's Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper), which is 
obviously not conducive to the required coherence. 
3. A Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
The Union shall pursue the above mentioned objectives by establishing systematic 
cooperation between the Member States and by gradually implementing joint action 
in the areas in which the Member States have important interests in common (Art. 
J.1/3). 
Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any 
matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure 
that their combined influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of 
concerted and convergent action. Whenever it deems it necessary, the Council 
shall define a common position. (Art. J.2/1-2) 
Article J.8 sets out the general decision making process. The European Council 
shall de£ ine the principles of and general guidelines for the CFSP. The Council 
shall take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing the CFSP on the 
basis of the general guidelines adopted by the European Council. It shall 
ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union. The 
Council shall act unanimously, except for procedural questions and in the case 
referred to in Article J.3(2). Any Member State or the Commission may refer to 
the Council any question relating to the CFSP and may submit proposals to the 
Council. A Political Committee consisting of Political Directors shall monitor 
the international situation in the areas covered by CFSP and contribute to the 
definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of 
the Council or on its own initiative. It shall also monitor the implementation 
of agreed policies. 
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The Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the CFSP 
field (Art. J.9). The European Parliament shall be consulted by the Presidency 
on the main aspects and the basic choices of the CFSP, and thus also of the 
development of the defence policy. The Presidency shall ensure that the views 
of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. The European 
Parliament shall be kept regularly informed by the Presidency and the Commission 
as to the development of the CFSP. The Parliament may ask questions of the 
Council or make recommendations to it. It shall hold an annual debate on 
progress made in implementing the CFSP. (Art. J.7) 
The Presidency shall represent the Union in matters coming within the scope of 
CFSP and shall be responsible for the implementation of common measures. In 
these tasks, it shall be assisted by the previous and next Member State to hold 
the Presidency. The Commission shall be fully associated in these tasks. (Art. 
J.S/1-3) 
The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy 
actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They 
shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union 
or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international 
relations (Art. J.1/4). 
Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations and 
at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such 
fora. In international organizations and at international conferences where not 
all the Member States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the 
common positions and shall keep the latter informed of any matter of common 
interest. Member States which are also members of the UN Security Council will 
concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States which 
are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their 
functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, 
without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the UN 
Charter. (Art. J.2/3 & J.S/4) 
The Treaty does not provide for sanctions in case a Member State does not live 
up to its obligations. Common foreign and security policy is, moreover, 
excluded from judicial control by the European Court of Justice. 
The decision-making process as defined in Article J .8 is supplemented with 
another procedure in two cases, namely for the adoption of joint actions and for 
decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. 
4. "Joint actions" 
One of the objectives of the Union is to gradually implement joint action in the 
areas in which the Member States have important interests in common. Article 
J.3 defines the procedure for adopting joint action in matters covered by the 
CFSP. The importance of this procedure is that, for the first time, the 
principle of majority vote is introduced in the field of external relations and 
security, even though the possible use of this principle will remain very 
limited. 
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The Council shall decide, on the basis of general guidelines set by the European 
Council, that a matter should be the subject of joint action. Whenever the 
Council decides on the principle of joint action, it shall lay down the specific 
scope, the Union's general and specific objectives in carrying out such action, 
if necessary its duration, and the means, procedures and conditions for its 
implementation. 
The Council shall, when adopting the joint action and at any stage during its 
development, define those matters on which decisions are to be taken by a 
qualified majority. For their adoption, acts of the Council shall require at 
least fifty-four votes in favour, cast by at least eight members. Joint actions 
shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct 
of their activity. 
The proposal made at the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union that 
decisions on implementation should be taken by a majority as a general rule was 
thus not retained. The possibility of decisions being taken by a majority 
consequently remains limited as it does not extend to defence questions (Art. 
J4/3), to policy issues that the Council does not explicitly designate as issues 
that may be the subject of joint actions (JS/2) and to general decisions 
concerning joint actions. Moreover, the decisions to take implementing 
decisions by a majority can still be blocked by a single Member State. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the principle of majority votes appears for the 
first time in the procedures concerning external affairs and security consti-
tutes an important symbolic change which can have practical consequences in the 
future. Moreover, the developments in the process of European integration 
indicate that the so-called right of veto is increasingly becoming a kind of 
"right of exile". 
The limited extent to which majority voting can formally be used needs also to 
be seen in the context of the "Declaration on voting in the field of the CFSP" 
added by the European Council to the Treaty on European Union. This declaration 
says that "with regard to Council decisions requiring unanimity, Member States 
will, to the extent possible, avoid preventing a unanimous decision where a 
qualified exists in favour of that decision". 
5. The European Union and defence issues 
Article J.4 speaks of the defence component of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, defines some restrictions and introduces a new player in the decision-
making and implementing procedures: the WEU. The inclusion of the defence 
aspect is one of the most significant innovations of the Treaty on European 
Union, just as the involvement of WEU in the policy of the Twelve constitutes 
an important institutional development. However, a considerable degree of 
ambiguity does remain. 
First, one of the objectives mentioned in Article B of the Common Provisions is 
repeated: The CFSP shall include all questions related to the security of the 
Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might 
in time lead to a common defence. However, issues having defence implications 
shall not be subject to the procedures set out in Article J.3. 
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Does this wording imply that the framing of a common defence policy is an 
obligation, whereas the development of a common defence is only an option? 
The Union requests the WEU, which is considered to be an integral part of the 
development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of 
the Union which have defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with 
the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements. (J4/2) 
Doubts remain in this article on the nature of the relationship between the 
Union and WEU. On the one hand, WEU seems to be subordinated to the Union, with 
WEU only having a secondary role in the CFSP: it is an integral part of the 
development of the Union; it has to elaborate and implement the decisions that 
are already taken by the Council; and it is the Council and not WEU that shall 
adopt the practical arrangements. 
On the other hand, the WEU also seems to retain its independence. It is only 
"part of the development of the Union" and thus not "part of the Union"; 
"request" can imply that WEU still can decide whether or not it accepts to 
implement the Union's request; and it has to give its agreement concerning the 
practical arrangements. 
Article J. 3 mentions that issues having defence implications shall not be 
subject to the procedures set out in Article J.3. 
This may imply that the procedures worked out in the context of the application 
of the modified Brussels Treaty remain fully valid for what concerns WEU. On 
the other hand, it also means that the procedures on decision-making as laid 
down in Article J.8 do apply for defense matters and that the possible (though 
limited) involvement of the European Parliament and Commission is accepted. 
Subdivision 4 and 5 of Article J.4 are meant to reassure both the Member States 
that want to prevent the existing organizations or policies from being 
undermined and the Member States that want to keep open the possibility of 
further cooperation in other fora and ad hoc alliances. 
These two subdivisions read as follows: The policy of the Union in accordance 
with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and 
defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of 
certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the 
common security and defence policy established within that framework (Art J4/4). 
The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer 
cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the 
framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, provided such cooperation does 
not run counter to or impede that provided for in this Title (Art. J4/5). 
Both subdivisions can be seen as a compromise between opposite concerns of 
certain Member States. First, there is the concern of the one neutral country 
in the European Union: Ireland. This provision can therefore be interpreted 
by candidate member states with a similar neutral statute as a proof that EC 
membership will not impede their traditional security and defence policy. 
Ambiguity concerning this "neutrality" might thus arise and complicate the 
further development of a security and defence policy. 
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Second, there is the policy of countries such as the United Kingdom that give 
priority to the Atlantic Alliance. Third, there are countries like France and 
Germany that want to be able to further develop their bilateral security and 
defence cooperation and to extend this cooperation to other countries if further 
security and defence cooperation and integration were to prove to be impossible 
in the framework of the Union or of WEU. 
Finally, it is provided that with a view to furthering the objectives of this 
Treaty, and having in view the date of 1998 in the context of Article XII of the 
Modified Brussels Treaty, the provisions of this Article may be revised on the 
basis of a report to be presented in 1996 by the Council to the European 
Council, which shall include an evaluation of the experience gained until then 
<Art . J 4 I 6 > • . 
Article J.4 does not give details about the relationship between the Union and 
WEU. A declaration on Western European Union added to the Treaty on European 
Union is in this context important as it further elaborates on the relationship 
of WEU with the European Union. The declaration also specifies the relationship 
between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, which also can effect the relationship 
between the European Union and the Alliance. 
6. The Declarations on Western European Union 
A declaration on "The Role of the WEU and its Relations with the European Union 
and with the Atlantic Alliance" issued by the countries which are members of WEU 
and also of the European Union is added to the Treaty on European Union. Its 
Articles 1 and 2 contain general provisions on the relationship between the WEU 
and the European Union and the Alliance. Article 2 mentions that WEU will be 
developed as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to 
strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. To this end, it will 
formulate common European defence policy and carry forward its concrete 
implementation through the further development of its own operational role. 
Article 3 on "WEU's relations with European Union" states that the objective is 
to build up WEU in stages as the defence component of the European Union. To 
this end, WEU is prepared, at the request of the European Union, to elaborate 
and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence 
implications. 
Similar remarks as those noted in the previous part on the ambiguity in the 
Union-WEU relationship do apply here. Doubts about the nature of this 
relationship are even strengthened through the involvement of a third partner: 
the Atlantic Alliance. Article 3 seems to imply a subordinate position of WEU 
vis-a-vis the Union, while Article 2 can be seen as an argument for WEU' s 
independence as it has the competence to formulate a common European defence 
policy. Another interpretation could be that this formulation of a common 
defence policy and carrying forward its concrete implementation consists only 
in developing its operational role, and that WEU's own role and independence are 
thus limited to the operational aspects. 
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Article 3 foresees several measures to develop a close working relationship with 
the Union. As appropriate, the dates and venues of meetings will be 
synchronized and the working methods harmonized. Close cooperation between the 
Council and Secretariat-General of WEU and the Council of the Union and the 
General Secretariat of the Council will be established, and the harmonization 
of the sequence and duration of the respective Presidencies will be considered. 
Appropriate modalities will be arranged so as to ensure that the EC Commission 
is regularly informed and, as appropriate, consulted on WEU activities in 
accordance with the role of the Commission in the CFSP. Finally, closer 
cooperation between the Parliamentary Assembly of WEU and the European 
Parliament will be encouraged. The WEU Council shall, in agreement with the 
competent bodies of the European Union, adopt the necessary practical 
arrangements. 
Significant in this paragraph is the fact that the aim is to develop a "working" 
relationship and not a "de jure" relationship, which points to an independent 
position of WEU. This also appears from the fact that the WEU and Union 
institutions are considered as equal partners. However, recent experience 
indicates that this synchronization and harmonization will imply that WEU adapt 
itself to the European Union. It is remarkable that the Commission of the 
European Communities will only be informed and consulted by the WEU institutions 
and that no "cooperation" is foreseen. 
Article 4 on "WEU' s relations with the Atlantic Alliance" declares that the 
objective is to develop WEU as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the 
Atlantic Alliance. Accordingly WEU is prepared to develop further the close 
working links between WEU and the Alliance and to strengthen the role, 
responsibilities and contributions of WEU member states in the Alliance. This 
will be undertaken on the basis of the necessary transparency and 
complementarity between the emerging European security and defence identity and 
the Alliance. WEU will act in conformity with the positions adopted in the 
Atlantic Alliance. 
Article 4 further mentions that WEU member states will intensify their 
coordination on Alliance issues which represent an important common interest 
with the aim of introducing joint positions agreed in WEU into the process of 
consultation in the Alliance which will remain the essential forum for 
consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing 
on the security and defence commitments of the Allies under the North Atlantic 
Treaty. 
Just as in the Union-WEU relationship doubt does arise on the nature of the WEU-
NATO relationship, which is also important for the Union as it determines the 
EU-NATO relationship too. First, there are different interpretations as to the 
role of WEU linked to the different views on the nature of the "European 
pillar". Is this European pillar- and thus also WEU -meant to be a fairly 
independent actor within the Alliance or is it only designed as a symbolic annex 
to NATO? Do the required "transparency and complementarity" impair or allow 
independent positions and actions of WEU? How will the requirement "to act in 
conformity" with the positions of the Alliance and the possibility to "introduce 
joint positions" in the Alliance be reconciled? 
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Further questions arise in Article 4 when it indicates that, where necessary, 
dates and venues of meetings will be synchronized and working methods 
harmonized, and that close cooperation will be established between the 
Secretariats-General of WEU and NATO. How will this requirement of 
synchronization and harmonization be reconciled with a similar requirement in 
the Union-WEU relationship? Will it not be necessary to give priority to one 
of the two relationships? 
The question about de facto implementation also appears in relation to Article 
7 which mentions that Member States m~y draw on a double-batting formula, to be 
worked out, consisting of their representatives to the Alliance and to the 
European Union. This should make possible that representation on the WEU 
Council is such that the Council is able to exercise its functions continuously 
in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
Article 5 of the Declaration states that WEU' s operational role will be 
strengthened, which is indeed necessary since the modified Brussels Treaty 
establishing WEU transferred most of WEU's military powers to NATO. WEU is to 
examine and define appropriate missions, structures and means, covering in 
particular a WEU planning cell, meetings of WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff, 
military units answerable to WEU, and closer military cooperation complementary 
to the Alliance in particularly in the fields of logistics, transport, training 
and strategic surveillance. As has been mentioned above, the June 1992 meeting 
of the WEU Council already decided on several of these matters. 
The answer on the above mentioned questions on the nature of the WEU-NATO 
relationship will also determine the nature, degree of independence and size of 
the WEU planning cell and of its military units and infrastructure. 
Arrangements aimed at giving WEU a stronger operational role will be fully 
compatible with the military dispositions necessary to ensure the collective 
defence of all Allies. Finally, this article states that it will examine 
whether cooperation can be enhanced in the field of armaments with the aim of 
creating a European armaments agency and whether the WEU Institute can be 
developed into a European Security and Defence Academy. 
A second Declaration of the member states of the WEU organizes the relationship 
between the WEU members and those countries that are not a member of WEU, and 
foresees the unity of WEU and European Union membership: States which are 
members of the European Union are invited to accede to WEU on conditions to be 
agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to 
become observers if they so wish. Simultaneously, other European Member States 
of NATO are invited to become associate members of WEU in a way which will give 
them the possibility of participating fully in the activities of WEU. The 
necessary treaties and agreements should be concluded before 31 December 1992. 
The WEU declarations clearly do not define unambiguously the degree of 
dependence or independence of WEU vis-a-vis the European Union and the Atlantic 
Alliance. Nor is it clear what the implications will be for the relationship 
between the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance. However, WEU seems to be 
an excellent instrument to conciliate the European Union and NATO as well as 
European identity and Atlantic solidarity. It thus contributes towards avoiding 
a rift within the European Union and to allow further progress towards European 
Union. 
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As is often the case, it will be practice rather than the formal texts that will 
determine the nature of the mutual relations. The new texts do in any case 
provide new opportunities and a formal legitimation for an increasing role of 
the European Union. And this may become important when in 1996 WEU will, just 
as the Union, re-examine the present provisions. 
III. 11 A COMMON DEFENCE POLICY, WHICH MIGHT IN TIME LEAD TO A COMMON DEFENCE": 
BASIC PRINCIPLES, THE RELATIONS WITH WEU AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, AND 
INSTITUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES 
In view of the conclusions concerning the changing European geopolitical 
landscape and security architecture, in view of the new formal basis provided 
for by the Treaty on European Union and by the WEU Declaration, and in view of 
the different attitudes of the Member States, it is necessary both to define the 
basic principles and characteristics of a future European security policy and 
structure and, in this context, of the relationship between the European Union, 
WEU and the Atlantic Alliance. It is necessary that a long-term view and basic 
principles are defined, that short-term and medium-term measures are proposed, 
and that transitional measures are provided to overcome the different attitudes 
of the Member States about both the scope of European security policy and 
structure and the pace to develop this policy and structure. 
A. A single institutional framework as basic principle 
(1) A single institutional framework is necessary in view of, firstly, the 
coherence required by the Treaty on European Union and, secondly, the demands 
of the new security situation which requires a coherence between all aspects 
(military and non-military) of a security policy. 
The need for a single institutional framework has consequences for the European 
Union, for its relationship with WEU, and for the transatlantic relationship. 
(2) This need for a single institutional framework has first of all 
consequences for the institutions of the Eurooean Union. Some general 
principles are laid down in this part, while detailed proposals are made in the 
next part. 
With regard to the Council action should be taken to facilitate the adoption of 
common positions and common actions in the field of exte:r:nal relations, security 
and defence. It also implies the establishment of one single uniform 
administrative structure which handles all aspects of external relations and 
security, and does not any longer consider a part of this policy area as coming 
under the authority of a special administrative unit as was the case with EPS 
and as is also now the case with the Political Committee (consisting of the 
Political Directors). 
A single institutional framework also implies one and the same institution 
exerting democratic control over this policy. The European Parliament thus has 
to receive the authority to scrutinize all aspects of external relations and 
security. Related to this principle is the need for increasing participation 
in the decision-making process in this policy area. 
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For the European Commission, a single institutional framework implies a growing 
role in all fields of external relations and security, as only this will 
guarantee a consistent policy and will allow that proposals are made and 
initiatives taken from a European point of view. 
The need for a single institutional framework implies that the external, 
security and defence policy should become subject to judicial review by the 
European Court of Justice, whilst taking into account the specific nature of 
security and defence decisions. This will increase the pressure on Member 
States to implement and obey the decisions adopted by the Community or Union. 
( 3) The need for a single institutional framework also has consequences for the 
EU-WEU relationship. Being part of the same development towards European Union, 
the EU and WEU will gradually have to merge, with WEU eventually being 
incorporated within the European Union by 1998, when the period of fifty years 
mentioned in Article XII of the Modified Treaty of Brussels comes to an end. 
Such a move should be prepared earlier so as to ensure a smooth transition in 
1998. 
This implies the primacy of the European Union over WEU, with the EU taking the 
political decisions concerning security and defence, and the WEU implementing 
the decisions which have defence implications. The ambiguity which characterizes 
Title V of the European Union Treaty as well as the WEU Declaration has to 
disappear. 
All EU Member States which are not members of WEU should accede to WEU or become 
observers. New member states of the EU will automatically become members or 
observers of WEU. 
(4) Finally, the need for a single institutional framework implies that all 
aspects of the relationship with the United States come under the responsibility 
of the same political authority. This implies that the European Union will also 
be responsible for defining the European position in NATO. 
This general responsibility of the Union will allow the development of a 
consistent attitude towards the USA and thus result in a less ambiguous 
relationship between the EU and the USA. This will contribute to improving the 
American-European relationship and be considered by the Americans as a positive 
change. 
B. The implementation of the single institutional framework principle 
As the putting into place of a single institutional framework for the external, 
security and defence policy of the Union clearly is a complicated enterprise, 
a gradual approach in several stages but with a clearly defined timetable should 
be taken. 
In stage one, the Union should put order into its own institutional set-up, 
clarifying the ambiguities that remain in the Treaty of Maastricht. This is to 
be prepared as of now. 
Stage two merges at a practical level the institutions of both the Union and 
WEU, thus preparing for their ultimate fusion. 
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Finally, in stage three, as a result of a new IGC and of the end of the period 
of fifty years mentioned in the Modified Treaty of Brussels, the Union absorbs 
WEU, taking full responsibility for external, security and defence policy as 
well as for relations with NATO. 
This whole process should be completed before 2000. 
( 1 ) The creation of a European Security and Defence Council within the 1urooean 
Union 
(1) As of now, the European Council defines the general guidelines, with the 
Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs making the general political decisions 
concerning all aspects of security and defence, and with the WEU Council taking 
the further implementing decisions. Majority decisions should be taken as much 
as possible. The meetings of the WEU Council should take place immediately 
after the meetings of the Union Council. 
(2) Stage I: 
- A European Security and Defence Council should be created within the European 
Union, composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Defence. This 
Council should make all the political decisions on security and defence, and ask 
the WEU institutions to implement the military aspects of these decisions and 
the European Commission to implement the other aspects. If necessary, a gradual 
and differentiated establishment of this European Security and Defence Council 
can be envisaged (see sub-division C). 
The Committee of Permanent Representatives should take over the 
responsibilities and competences of the Political Committee. 
(3) Stage II: 
The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence should meet simultaneously as the 
European Security and Defence Council and as the WEU Council. The Joint Chiefs 
of Staff of the countries involved can be invited to join these meetings. The 
use of majority voting should become common practice for security and defence 
policy, taking into account the specific nature of this policy area. 
(4) Stage III: 
The European Security and Defence Council should have responsibilities for all 
tasks and functions of the WEU Council, and formally replaces the WEU Council. 
(2) A growing role for the European Parliament in the security and defence 
policy 
(1) Already now, the European Parliament puts forward its own proposals, a 
process which will be enhanced by the Treaty on European Union. By way of 
presenting a long-term view and proposing practical measures to realize these 
long-term objectives, the Parliament can increasingly influence the development 
of a European security and defence policy, and emphasize the need that Europe 
assumes its responsibilities concerning its own security and defence. The EP 
establishes close, though not binding contacts with the WEU Assembly. 
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(2) Stage I: 
Article IX of WEU's Modified Brussels Treaty has to be adapted so as to 
ensure that the WEU Assembly is composed of the Members of the WEU member states 
that are elected to the EP instead of the "representatives of the Brussels 
Treaty Powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe". The 
latter provision in the Brussels Treaty was a normal solution in 1954 when there 
was not yet a EP. This solution is however no longer acceptable as the WEU 
Assembly, unlike the EP, is under the current provisions not included in the 
normal process of European integration in which the EP's democratic control and 
joint decision-making power are steadily growing. The amending of Article IX 
will solve this problem and also assure consistency and coherence in democratic 
control. 
On the basis of an annual debate, the European Parliament should scrutinize 
the main aspects and the basic choices of the Union's external, security and 
defence policy as defined by the European Security and Defence Council, 
eventually accepting or rejecting the decisions taken, with the WEU Assembly, 
then composed of the MEPs of WEU member states, taking the decisions of the EP 
on defence issues. 
- The Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security of the European Parliament and 
the Committees of WEU should intensify their cooperation. The European 
Parliament should establish a full Committee on Security and Defence. 
(3) Stage II 
- The European Parliament and the WEU Assembly, the latter made up of the MEPs 
from the WEU member states, should have joint sessions. 
By means of an interinsti tutional agreement a compulsory procedure of 
consultation should be established between the European Security and Defence 
Council, the European Parliament and the Commission before decisions are made 
on external policy, security and defence. The EP Committee on Security and 
Defense should assume a central role in this consultation. (Poettering report, 
PE 146.269/fin., p. 10). 
The provisions of the TEU on the assent of the European Parliament for 
international agreements should be broadly interpreted. 
The WEU Committees and the EP Committees having competence for external, 
security and defence issues should meet simultaneously. 
- In view of the frequent need to react quickly on certain international events 
procedures should be adopted by the EP to allow the Committee on Security and 
Defense or the Bureau of this Committee to meet without delay, to have 
consultations with representatives of the Council and Commission, and to make 
recommendations to the Council. The EP's representatives should be able to 
request the Council to act in a certain manner, or can give legitimacy to 
certain decisions or acts of the Council. This will strengthen the legitimacy 
of both Parliament and Council. (Verde I Aldea report, PE 201.471/B, pp. 9-11) 
(4) Stage III: 
- The European Parliament should replace fully the WEU Assembly at plenary and 
committee level. 
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- The assent of the European Parliament should be extended to the conclusion of 
agreements between the Union and third countries or international organizations 
on disarmament and arms control as well as to defence agreements wherein the 
Union is involved. 
- The assent of the European Parliament by absolute majority of its members 
should be required for fundamental decisions on external policy, security and 
defence (e.g. accession to a military alliance, changes in the military-
strategic options, decisions on common military action in conflicts). 
(Poettering report, p. 10) 
The European Parliament should receive a non-exclusive right of initiative. 
3. The creation of a Directorate-General for Security and Defence within the 
European Commission and of the function of Commissioner for Security and Defence 
( 1) Already now, the Commission is increasing the cooperation with WEU' s 
agencies, to allow an improve coherence between all aspects of security. 
(2) Stage I: 
Within the European Commission, a Directorate-General for External Affairs and 
Security and the function of Commissioner for External Affairs and Security 
should be created. This Directorate-General has to follow and analyse all 
aspects of external relations and security. This should make it possible to 
propose actions which can solve or de-escalate existing problems and crises. 
This also will make it possible to foresee potential problems and crises and to 
propose adequate measures by making use of the non-military instruments of the 
EC's security policy. 
(3) Stage II: 
The functions of the EU Commissioner for External Relations and Security and of 
the Secretary General of WEU should be exercised by one and the same individual. 
The Commission's Directorate-General for External Affairs and Security and WEU' s 
Secretariat-General which is responsible for the defence aspects should remain 
formally separate, though the cooperation and interrelationship between both 
administrations should be intensively strengthened. 
(4) Stage III: 
The WEU Secretariat-General should be incorporated within the European 
Commission's Directorate-General for External Relations and Security, and the 
latter should be renamed DG for External Relations, Security and Defence. This 
Directorate-General should then have to analyse and submit proposals concerning 
both the military and non-military aspects of the European security situation 
and policy. 
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C. A gradual and differentiated development 
Taking into account the different positions of the Member States concerning 
further cooperation and integration in the field of security and defence, and 
considering the solutions chosen in Maastricht for similar problems in the field 
of monetary integration, a gradual and differentiated development may be 
adopted, with not all Member States being obliged to participate at the same 
moment to the same extent in intensified integration in the security and defence 
area. 
Three scenarios can be foreseen, with different degrees of participation both 
in the number of countries as in the commitment towards future participation: 
(a) All Member States participate from the first stage on to the European 
Security and Defence Council: this scenario is to be preferred as it would 
guarantee clarity and transparency in the European integration process. 
(b) If the first scenario proves to be impossible, the solution chosen for the 
EMU should be adopted: all Member States accept the objectives and principles, 
but some Member States may prefer not to participate from the beginning. If 
there is a majority of countries willing to participate, the European Security 
and Defence Council is created, with the other Member States being able to join 
later or have observer status. 
(c) If the second scenario would prove to be impossible too, the following 
solution could be chosen: only some (a majority) of the Member States accept 
the objectives and principles and create the European Security and Defence 
Council, with the other Member States accepting that the EU's institutions, 
procedures, etc. can be used for this policy field. 
(d) A fourth scenario might be that, in the event of the previous option not 
being possible either, certain Member States would feel obliged to create a 
European Security and Defence Council which would then have to formally act 
independently from the European Union. This Council would nevertheless try to 
coordinate its policy with the policy of the Union. It would make all necessary 
efforts to make possible the inclusion over time of the European Security and 
Defence Council within the formal EU framework. This ultimate scenario has to 
be avoided as it would have negative implications for the required consistency 
and institutional unity. 
The Member States participating in the European Security and Defence Council 
may, under certain conditions, choose not to participate in certain decisions 
or in the implementation of certain decisions, not preventing the other Member 
States from making decisions and properly implementing them. This opting-out 
clause may facilitate the participation of all Member States. 
The final objective should be to have all Member States participating, and to 
increasingly restrict the opting-out clause. In 1998, WEU should be completely 
incorporated within the European Union, with the Union assuming the 
responsibilities and competences of WEU. 
D. The growing operational role of the WEU as implementing institution and the 
creation of a Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee 
The mission of WEU is to implement the political decisions of the European Union 
which have defence implications. 
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To be able to implement the political decisions of the EU, WEU has to strengthen 
its operational capabilities, elaborating further on its "Petersberg 
Declaration" of 19 June 1992. 
Though cooperation with NATO will be necessary at first, and will remain highly 
desirable, WEU has to aim at full operational independence so as to enable it 
in time to act independently from NATO after consultation with NATO allies. WEU 
thus has to be able to immediately implement decisions taken by the EU without 
having to depend on the approval of other international organizations, even 
though consultation and collaboration with other organizations such as the CSCE, 
the UN and especially NATO always will have to be pursued. 
This implies that WEU must be able to rely on military forces of its own. 
Besides, it should also be able to rely - after approval of the authorities 
involved - on specific NATO forces, such as on the new Rapid Action Force, and 
on other bilateral or multilateral forces such as the Franco-German forces, 
which are intended to be transformed into a Eurocorps with other countries 
participating. 
The required independence also implies that WEU dispose of information and 
planning facilities and command structures that can function independently. WEU 
can achieve this by making use of the experience gained by its member states in 
cooperating within the NATO structure and within the context of Franco-German 
military cooperation. The operational planning cell, foreseen in the WEU 
Declaration adopted in Maastricht, therefore must be considerably strengthened. 
In a first period, operational independence should be pursued in cooperation 
with NATO, through the use of a combined military command structure and of a 
double-hatting formula, with a command structure and with military forces of the 
WEU countries that can be used in the WEU framework as well as in the NATO 
context. 
A Committee of Joint Chiefs of Staff should be created and must assume the 
military leadership of the WEU forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff can be 
requested to participate in the meetings of the European Security and Defence 
Council. 
G. The possible involvement of European non-EU countries in the external. 
security and defence policy of the Union 
The involvement of these countries has to be stimulated as this will prepare 
them for possible future membership of the European Union. 
The involvement of these countries is also important as participation in the 
EU's security and defence policy and actions may provide a wider perspective for 
the security and defence policies of these countries and can thus have a 
significant stabilizing impact on the European security situation. It indeed 
can help to ensure that destabilizing unilateral actions are not taken by 
countries involved in a conflict or crisis. 
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The clauses on "political dialogue" included in the European Agreements with 
Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have to be further developed. 
These clauses provide for meetings at ministerial level within the Association 
Council, for meetings at lower levels and between the presidents of the three 
associated countries and the presidents of the European Council and Commission, 
and for a joint parliamentary committee. 
More generally, the EU can pursue closer security and defence cooperation with 
other European states through the common participation of all E~opean states 
to the CSCE. Procedures to facilitate this cooperation have to be elaborated, 
making use of the experience gained during the Yugoslav crisis, with the CSCE 
supporting the EC's decision to send monitors to the Yugoslav republics and with 
other CSCE countries deciding to provide people to join the EC observers team. 
H. The relationship with the Atlantic Alliance 
The WEU should become the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. It should 
increasingly introduce joint positions into the process of consultation in the 
Atlantic Alliance. This should happen on the basis of the political options 
adopted within the European Union. 
If possible and appropriate, the European countries should make their decisions 
and act in the field of defence within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. 
If consensus cannot be found within the Alliance concerning certain decisions 
and actions, the European member states should be able to take decisions and 
take actions within the European Security and Defence Council. 
In practice, a division of labour should be found between the Atlantic Alliance 
and the European Union (and its European Security and Defence Council). 
Different categories of actions may be defined, with some actions being under 
the exclusive authority of the Atlantic Alliance, some under the exclusive 
authority of the European Community and its European Security and Defence 
Council, and other actions under the concurrent responsibility of both. 
The European member states of the Atlantic Alliance which are not a member of 
the European Union may become associate members of WEU. 
As from Stage II (see subdivision B), the European Security and Defence Council 
should meet as the WEU Council within the Atlantic Alliance. 
As from Stage Ill (see subdivision B), with the incorporation of WEU within the 
European Union, the European Union should replace WEU as the European Pillar of 
the Atlantic Alliance. 
Before Stage III the existing North Atlantic Treaty should be adapted or a new 
treaty agreed between the United States and the European Union to better reflect 
the new equal relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic. This will 
meet the increasing pressure in both Europe and the United States to adapt the 
transatlantic relationship to the new geopolitical landscape. It will also stop 
the Atlantic Alliance from being undermined as a result of the ambiguous 
situation which now exists. 
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ANNEX: TIMETABLE 
Stage I: 
- A European Security and Defence Council is created within the European Union, 
composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Defence. 
- COREPER takes over the responsibilities and competences of the Political 
Committee. 
Article IX of WEU's Modified Brussels Treaty has to be adapted so as to 
ensure that the WEU Assembly is composed of the Members of the WEU member states 
that are elected to the EP. 
- The EP scrutinizes on the basis of an annual debate the main aspects and the 
basic choices of the Union's external, security and defence policy, eventually 
accepting or rejecting the decisions taken by the European Security and Defence 
Council. 
The EP' s Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security and WEU Committees 
intensify their cooperation and the EP establishes a full Committee on Security 
and Defence. 
A DG for External Affairs and Security and the function of Commissioner for 
External Affairs and Security are created. 
Stage II: 
The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence meet simultaneously as the 
European Security and Defence Council and as the WEU Council, with the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff of the countries involved being possibly invited to join these 
meetings. The use of majority voting becomes common practice for security and 
defence policy taking into account the specific nature of this policy area. 
- The European Security and Defence Council meets as the WEU Council within the 
Atlantic Alliance. 
The EP and the WEU Assembly have joint sessions, while the EP and WEU 
Committees having competence for external, security and defence issues also have 
joint meetings. 
By means of an interinsti tutional agreement a compulsory procedure of 
consultation is established between the European Security and Defence Council, 
the EP and the Commission before decisions are made on external policy, security 
and defence. 
Procedures are adopted by the EP to allow the Committee on Security and 
Defense or its Bureau to meet without delay in case of sudden international 
crises, to have consultations with representatives of the Council and 
Commission, and to make recommendations to the Council. 
- The functions of the EU Commissioner for External Relations and Security and 
of the Secretary General of WEU are exercised by one and the same individual. 
- The Commission's DG for External Affairs and Security and WEU's Secretariat-
General which is responsible for defence aspects remain formally separate, 
though the cooperation and interrelationship between both administrations are 
intensively strengthened. 
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Stage III 
End of the period of fifty years mentioned in Article XII of the Modified 
Brussels Treaty establishing WEU. Complete incorporation of WEU within the 
European Union, with the latter taking over all responsibilities and competences 
of WEU. 
The European Union replaces WEU as the European Pillar of the Atlantic 
Alliance, with the latter being based on an adapted North Atlantic Treaty or on 
a new treaty agreed between the United States and the European Union. 
The European Security and Defence Council has responsibility for all tasks 
and functions of the WEU Council, and formally replaces the WEU Council. 
The EP fully replaces the WEU Assembly at plenary and committee level. 
The EP' s assent by absolute majority of its members is required for 
fundamental decisions on external policy, security and defence, and is extended 
to the conclusion of agreements between the Union and third countries or 
international organizations on disarmament and arms control as well as to 
defence agreements in which the Union is involved. 
The EP receives a non-exclusive right of initiative. 
The WEU Secretariat-General is absorbed within the EU' s DG for External 
Relations and Security, which is renamed DG for External Relations, Security and 
Defence, and which has to analyse and submit proposals concerning both the 
military and non-military aspects of the European security situation and policy. 
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ANNEX I 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION tabled pursuant to Rule 45 (formerly 63) of the Rules 
of Procedure by Mr BOURLANGES and Mr ROUMELIOTIS 
on future relations between the European Community, the Western European Union 
and the North Atlantic Alliance, 
The European Parliament, 
A. having regard to its resolutions on security policy within the terms of 
reference of a future European union, 
B. having regard to the outcome of the Maastricht Summit as regards the 
development of a common foreign and security policy and particularly the 
new terms of the Treaty, whereby the WEU is charged with drafting and 
implementing the European Union's decisions and activities with defence 
policy implications, 
C. in view of the Maastricht Declaration by the members of the WEU, whereby 
institutional provisions should be made with respect to relations between 
the WEU, the European Community and the North Atlantic Alliance, as well 
as between the Parliamentary Assembly of the WEU and the European 
Parliament, 
1 . Regrets the outcome of the Maastricht Summit as far as the European 
Parliament's scope for cooperation in foreign and security policy matters 
is concerned; 
2. Believes that, in view of the new terms of the Treaty, the time has come 
for direct relations between institutions and organizations in Europe 
responsible for security and defence matters, including the North Atlantic 
Alliance, so as to take account of the new realities; 
3. Is convinced that the development of a common foreign and security policy 
will result in coordination and cooperation with existing parliamentary 
assemblies; 
4. Instructs its President to refer this matter to the appropriate committee. 
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(Rule 120 of the Rules of Procedure) 
of the Committee on Foreign ~£fairs and Security 
for the Committee on Institutional Affairs 
Craftsman: Mr Hans-Gert POETTERING 
At its meeting of 14 July 1993 the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security 
appointed Mr Poettering draftsman. 
At its meetings of 18 February and 2 June 1993 the Subcommittee on Security and 
Disarmament considered the draft opinion. 
At its meetings of 30 June 1993 and 7 October 1993 the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and Security considered the draft opinion. 
At the latter meeting it adopted the conclusions and amendments contained 
therein by 25 votes to 41 with 4 abstentions. 
The following were present at the vote: Baron Crespo 1 chairman; Poettering1 
draftsman; Aglietta 1 Apolinario (for Magnani Noya), Balfe 1 Barton (for Coates), 
Cheysson 1 Christensen (for Canavarro), Crampton, da Cunhan Oliveira (for 
Cravinho), Dillen, Elles (for Bethell) 1 Fernandez Albor 1 Ferrer (for Bernard-
Reymond), Ford (for Newens) 1 Gfrnther, Habsburg, Hansch, Jepsen, Lacaze 1 Langer, 
Llorca Vilaplana, Marck (for Lenz) 1 Miranda de Lage (for Planas), Onesta, 
Penders, Pesmazoglou, Piecyk, Prag (for McMillan-Scott), Sakellariou, Salema 
(for Gawronski), Sonneveld (for Forte) 1 Suarez Gonzalez (for Cassanmagnago 
Cerretti), Titley, Verde i Aldea (for Trivelli), Visser (for Schmid) 1 
von Wechmar (for Holzfuss) and Woltjer. 
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I. DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY 
1. Provisions of the Treaty 
Considering that a common security policy had long been fundamentally 
controversial, the prov1s1ons adopted in Maastricht together with the 
Declaration by the Western European Union (WEU) Member States annexed to the 
Treaty in this connection go further than expected. The Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) is to include 'all questions related to the security of 
the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might 
in time lead to a common defence' (Article J4(1)). 
The WEU is upgraded to the status of an integral part of the development of 
European Union and the security policy of the Union is to be 'compatible' with 
that of the Atlantic Alliance (Article J4(2) and (4)). The incorporation of the 
WEU into the European Union integration process goes a long way to answering the 
concerns of the advocates of a self-contained European security policy (notably 
France), while the compatibility postulate vis-a-vis the Atlantic Alliance 
performs an equivalent service for advocates of a Euro-Atlantic security policy 
(notably Britain). 
Pursuant to Article J4 of the provisions on CFSP, the WEU, as 'an integral part 
of the development of the Union', will, at the request of the Union 'elaborate 
and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence 
implications'. The Declaration by the WEU Member States (see Annex to 
Maastricht Treaty) nevertheless stresses the dual function of the WEU: it is 
to become both the 'defence component of the European Union' and a 'means to 
strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance'. 
The two sets of joint proposals launched in October 1991 by Britain and Italy 
on the one hand and France and Germany on the other, representative as they are 
of two fundamental tendencies in the positions of the Member States, are a clear 
indication that different interpretations should be attached to each of these 
two components. The Franco-German proposal gives priority to the first, the 
Anglo-Italian to the second. 
In the WEU Declaration overall a slight bias can be detected in favour of the 
Franco-German proposal, the structural and substantive principles of which have 
been incorporated. In addition, the proposed relations between the Union and 
the WEU are set out in greater detail that those between the WEU and the 
Atlantic Alliance. In general terms, the dates and venues of Union and WEU 
meetings are to be synchronized and their working procedures harmonized. On the 
development of working relations between the institutions of the Union and WEU, 
the following points are stipulated in particular: 
Close cooperation between the Councils and Secretariats-General of the 
Union and the WEU as well as between the European Parliament and the WEU 
Parliamentary Assembly; 
Possibly, harmonization of the sequence and duration of the two 
presidencies; 
The Commission to be kept informed and consulted on WEU activities. 
The merger of the WEU with the European Community/Union urged by the European 
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Parliament and the Commission is alluded to cautiously where reference is made 
in the context of the Treaty review scheduled for 1996 to the expiry of the 
Brussels Treaty in 1998 (Article J4 ( 6)). The President-in-Office of the 
Council, Mr De Deus Pinheiro, addressing the European Parliament's Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and Security on 19 February 1992, stated in reply to a Member's 
question that in the long term the WEU could certainly be expected to merge with 
the European Union. 
In the more immediate future, however, it would appear that the WEU is 
consolidating around a strengthening of its operational role and establishing 
itself as a defence policy community alongside the 'CFSP' Community. The 
operational structuring of the WEU will include a WEU planning cell, closer 
military cooperation (in particular on logistics, transport, training and 
strategic surveillance), meetings of chiefs of general staff, with military 
units also 'being answerable' to the WEU. 
2. Areas of controversy 
Any such forced institutionalization of the WEU as a defence policy structure 
paralleling European Union would raise three fundamental problems: non-
coincident membership; potential conflicts of terms of reference as between 
Union and WEU; and, in particular, lack of parliamentary supervision of WEU 
activities. 
The problem posed by non-coincident membership of the Union and the WEU was 
acknowledged by the WEU ministers when they issued a second declaration in 
which Greece, Denmark and Ireland were invited to accede to the WEU by the 
end of 1992 or to assume observer status. This was successful to the 
extent that at the WEU Council in Rome in November 1992 the decision was 
taken to admit Greece as a member of the WEU in 1993, but the positions of 
Ireland and Denmark continued to pose problems for a common defence policy 
on the basis of the WEU. 
The problem has if anything been compounded by the fact that since the Rome 
decisions of 20 November 1992 both countries now enjoy permanent observer 
status in the WEU, which means that they will not be involved to the same 
extent in the development of a common defence policy for the foreseeable 
future. 
In the case of Denmark, and subsequent to the 'no' vote in the referendum 
on the Treaty on European Union, a statement to that effect was even 
written into the conclusions of the Presidency of the Edinburgh Summit of 
12 December 1992, with the Heads of State and Government acknowledging that 
the Treaty on European Union did not in any sense commit Denmark to 
acceding to the WEU, that Denmark would not be required to participate in 
drawing up and implementing decisions and actions of the Union having 
defence implications, and that Denmark would relinquish its right to hold 
the presidency of the Union in cases where decisions and actions of the 
Union having defence implications were to be drawn up or implemented. 
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This initial concession to 'variable geometry' for the purposes of CFSP, 
and in particular defence policy, may well set a precedent that could come 
into play should Austria, Sweden, and Finland, not to say Switzerland - all 
four of them traditionally neutral countries - apply to accede to the 
European Union in mid-decade, as, given the terms of the Edinburgh Summit, 
they may well be expected to do. 
Conflicts of competence between the Union and WEU could also arise in the 
area of armaments cooperation. This continues to be excluded from the 
obligations existing under the internal market and is now (possibly) to be 
strengthened in the WEU framework with the objective of creating a European 
armaments agency. Notwithstanding the safeguards clause provided by 
Article 223(1)(a) and (b), first phrase, of the EEC Treaty, the part of the 
armaments sector in which 'products which are not intended for specifically 
military purposes' that are not contained in the list drawn up pursuant to 
Article 223(2) is subject to the conditions of competition of the internal 
market. Assuming a real commitment to securing armaments cooperation, it 
would therefore be logical for the part of the armaments sector producing 
for military purposes also to be made subject to the conditions of the 
internal market and therefore to the authority of the Community or the 
Union (Asolo List). At the present time, even with armaments cooperation 
at WEU intergovernmental level, Community and CFSP monitoring mechanisms 
are being evaded. 
The inadequacy of supervision of the WEU by the Union is the central 
problem of cooperation between the two organizations. The fact that the 
WEU is to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union at the 
latter's request is not the same as saying that the WEU also has to answer 
to the Union for its actions. This again poses the problem that membership 
of the WEU Council of Ministers as the executive institution is well-nigh 
identical with the Council of the EC, the institution that holds decision-
making powers. The proposed closer cooperation between the European 
Parliament and the WEU Assembly is insufficient, not least because the 
Assembly can exercise no supervisory powers over the WEU Council. At the 
very least the obligation to consult and inform the European Parliament 
should also apply to the WEU Council if the WEU is to act on behalf of the 
Union in any capacity. 
The European Parliament's requirements go significantly further. The 
European Parliament has specifically called for the creation of any 
military component of the EC to be made subject to its approval (B3-
1703/91, paragraph 11). The European Parliament has also called for the 
power to oppose by a majority of its Members any resort to the use of 
(military) force (B3-1639/91 paragraph 6). 
Experience at national level generally points strongly to the conclusion 
that parliamentary superv1s1on of any common security and defence policy 
will be absolutely essential. 
Looking ahead to the review of the Treaty in 1996, the European Parliament 
ought therefore to press for genuine parliamentary supervision of any 
future common security and defence policy. 
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3. Operational role of the WEU 
As part of the process of strengthening the operational role of the WEU, 
military units are to be assigned to it. This provision is open to a variety 
of readings in the light of the Franco-German and Anglo-Italian proposals. 
France and Germany understand it as meaning ultimately a European army with the 
Franco-German corps at its centre and which could be operationally deployed over 
an unlimited area. Italy and Britain prefer to think in terms of a European 
'reaction force' that would go operational only outside the NATO area. 
As part of the 'closer military cooperation complementary to the Alliance' urged 
in the WEU declaration, the WEU is to become operationally meshed with NATO. 
Since the areas of cooperation specifically listed of logistics, transport (in 
particular long-distance transport with in-flight refuelling) and strategic 
surveillance involve precisely the kinds of capabilities without which an 'out 
of area' deployment of WEU forces would be technically impossible. 
A possible compromise between the Anglo-Italian and Franco-German positions 
might take the form of so-called 'dual earmarking' of the Rapid Reaction Corps 
for Allied Command Europe approved in principle by NATO in June 1991 in 
Copenhagen according to operational geographical area ('NATO area': NATO; 'out 
of area': WEU). 
However, before technical and organizational arrangements for constituting a 
West European intervention corps are taken, it will undoubtedly be essential to 
hold a fundamental debate on the conditions under which 'out of area' 
deployments would be authorized. Clarification will be needed in particular on 
the question of whose control (WEU, European Union, NATO) and under whose 
auspices (the Union, CSCE, United Nations) such operations would be mounted. 
As regards the second role of the WEU as a European pillar of the Atlantic 
Alliance, the following point should be made: WEU Member States are, 'on issues 
which represent an important common interest', in future to agree common 
positions through the Alliance's consultation procedure. In practice meeting 
dates and venues of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance will where necessary be 
synchronized, their working methods harmonized and close cooperation established 
between their secretariats-general. 
The (permanent) representation on the WEU Council is to be provided under a 
'double-batting' formula by the representatives to the Alliance and the European 
Union. To facilitate execution of the new dual role the WEU Council and 
Secretariat were transferred to Brussels at the beginning of 1993. 
At the same time cooperation between the WEU Council and the European Union 
Council ought to be facilitated by synchronizing the presidencies, i.e. having 
the same country taking the chair in both bodies at any one time. A different 
arrangement would have to be found for Denmark and Ireland since these two 
countries only have observer status at the WEU. 
It is also to be recommended that Commission representatives should attend 
meetings of the WEU Council to improve exchanges of information and cooperation. 
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II. POSITIONS TAKEN BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
In recent years the European Parliament has repeatedly taken a position on the 
structuring of future relations between the European Community on the one side 
and the Atlantic Alliance and the WEU on the other. 
As regards the Maastricht Treaty of Union and the annexed Declaration on WEU, 
the report by the Committee on Institutional Affairs rightly concentrates on 
relations between the Community institutions and WEU bodies. 
Looking back on the positions adopted hitherto by the European Parliament on 
this pattern of relations, it can clearly be seen that the conclusions of the 
report by the Committee on Institutional Affairs continue the logic of the 
positions previously adopted: 
1. Parliament's resolution on the Helsinki II Conference (9 October 1990) 
notes that the Treaty of Rome may not stand in the way of transferring 
unrestricted powers in security and defence matters to the European Union, 
and that, far from being revived, the Western European Union should be 
integrated into the European Union. 
2. In its resolution of 10 June 1991 on the prospects for a European security 
policy, highlighting the significance of a European security policy and its 
impact on European Political Union, the European Parliament advocates close 
cooperation and the coordination of the Community's activities and those 
of the future European Union in the area of foreign and security policy 
with the institutions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and calls 
for the commitments entered into by the Member States under the WEU Treaty 
to be taken into account in drawing up a common foreign and security policy 
of the European Community and adjusted to Community policy. 
3. In its resolution on the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union 
(B3-1639/91) the European Parliament calls for: 
- the phased implementation of security and defence policy with a precise and 
binding timetable, taking into account the time limits laid down in the WEU 
Treaty, 
- the possibility of certain executive powers over Community decisions to be 
conferred on the WEU until 1996, 
- the powers of the WEU to be transferred to the Community after that date, 
- the formulation of security and defence policy to be regarded as falling 
within the Community's sphere of competence, taking due account of the 
various Member States' international commitments, particularly within NATO. 
4. In its resolution of 7 April 1992 on the results of the Intergovernmental 
Conferences the European Parliament complains that the 'pillar' structure 
of the treaty of Union 'leaves the common foreign and security policy 
outside the European Community Treaty' and 'provides for defence matters 
to be delegated to WEU without providing for appropriate parliamentary 
control of the activities of this organization'. 
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5. The same criticism is repeated in the resolution on the establishment of 
the European Community's common foreign policy of 18 December 1992, in 
which the European Parliament takes the view that arrangements for 
implementing the mechanisms laid down in the Maastricht Treaty for 
interaction between Parliament, Commission and Council in the area of 
security policy must be developed. In that connection rules must be drawn 
up with the other participating institutions, in particular the WEU Council 
that are compatible with an efficient discharge of the duties of 
representation and democratic supervision incumbent upon the European 
Parliament. 
6. And in the resolution on the structure and strategy of the European Union, 
looking ahead to its extension and the creation of a pan-European order, 
of 20 January 1993 the European Parliament takes a position on the 
structuring of relations with the WEU and NATO. In particular it calls for 
the WEU, as a mechanism of common defence policy, to be more closely linked 
with the institutions of the European Union during a transitional period 
and to be integrated into the Union in 1996. It also welcomes the WEU 
decisions of 19 June 1992 on the institutionalizing and structuring of 
dialogue, consultation and cooperation with the states of Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
In relation to NATO Parliament takes the view that that organization is 
going through a process of organizational and material redefinition from 
which it can be expected to emerge as a mechanism guaranteeing security for 
the whole of Europe and maintaining close ties between Europe on the one 
hand and the USA and Canada on the other. It expresses the hope that NATO 
will become the central element in a comprehensive non-aggression and 
mutual assistance pact to be concluded by all its Member States with all 
other European states, including Russia and possibly other states on the 
territory of the former USSR, together with the European Union. 
7. The European Parliament again comments on cooperation between the WEU, the 
European Union, NATO, the CSCE and the United Nations in its resolution of 
27. 5. 1993 on developments in East-West relations in Europe and their impact 
on European security, calling inter alia upon the European Community to 
commit itself at all levels to building up a common, concordant, pan-
European security system involving the existing security organizations 
(NATO, WEU, NACC, etc.) within the framework of the CSCE (para. 19). EPC 
and the Member States are similarly asked to take initiatives along these 
lines within NATO and the WEU (para. 20). Parliament also calls for a 
policy of convergence and burden-sharing between the various European and 
Euro-Atlantic institutions (para. 37) and expresses the wish that 
organizations such as NATO and the WEU should act as far as possible only 
within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations and that an 
effort would be made towards the further development of the United Nations 
as a peacemaking organization (para. 36). 
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III. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE WEU ASSEMBLY AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Several members of the WEU Assembly and its secretariat had expressed concern 
at the draft report by the Committee on Institutional Affairs on future 
relations between the European Community, WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, in 
particular on the grounds that it called for the WEU Assembly to be merged with 
the European Parliament. 
The President of the WEU Assembly also stated in a circular letter in November 
1992 that the WEU Assembly would invoke the subsidiarity principle to enable it 
to discharge to the fullest extent the responsibilities transferred to it by the 
Brussels Treaty, as supplemented by the Maastricht Treaty. In other words, the 
WEU Assembly advocates a division of responsibilities whereby the military 
aspects of the CFSP would remain within its terms of reference and the European 
Parliament would confine its attentions to isolated economic and political 
aspects of security. 
The same political line is taken by the rapporteur to the WEU Assembly for 
parliamentary debates on the security policy laid down in the Maastricht Treaty 
(Nufiez report), who regrets that in a number of European Parliament texts it is 
urged that the latter should replace the WEU Assembly in the long term and 
exercise sole parliamentary supervision in the area of security and defence in 
the European Union. The rapporteur takes the view that the requirement of 
closer cooperation between the Parliamentary Assembly of the WEU and the 
European Parliament as laid down in the declaration on the WEU annexed to the 
Maastricht Treaty, would help to secure adoption of the controversial proposals 
contained in the European Parliament texts cited above. 
In the WEU report on the European Union, the WEU and the impact of Maastricht 
(Goerens report) tabled at the last plenary sitting of the WEU Assembly in 
December 1992 in Paris, it is also regretted that one consequence of the 
positions adopted by the European Parliament has been to complicate closer 
cooperation between the Parliamentary Assembly of WEU and the European 
Parliament. The same report also contains information about the results of the 
talks held between President Klepsch and the then President of the WEU Assembly, 
Mr Soell on 23 October 1992, in which both presidents are said to have decided 
to meet regularly and to have considered the option of meetings between 
committees or subcommittees of the two assemblies. 
The report points out that exchanges between the two assemblies must be based 
on the principles of equality and reciprocity and that consequently while there 
continues to be no observer status in the European Parliament, the WEU Assembly 
cannot grant Members of the European Parliament equivalent status (although it 
is free to grant such status). 
In the Goerens report the position of the WEU Assembly is clearly set out and 
the view is taken that as long as defence continues to be subject to the 
sovereignty of the states only an assembly composed of delegations from the 
parliaments of those states will be in a position to discharge the duties that 
Article IX of the amended Brussels Treaty had transferred to the WEU Assembly 
in the context of European cooperation in the area of defence. 
Despite obvious divergencies in the respective positions the signal has been 
given that members and the secretariat of the WEU Assembly are fully prepared 
to create closer links with the European Parliament and to pursue the objective 
of European Union jointly. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The report by the Committee on Institutional Affairs clearly acknowledges the 
new security policy situation in Europe together with the terms of reference of 
the Maastricht Treaty and the Declaration by the WEU Member States contained in 
it. In that connection the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security considers 
the following points as meriting the highest priority: 
1. With the Maastricht Treaty, the Western European Union (WEU) is acknowledged 
as an integral part of the process of development of the European Union and, 
in accordance with the Declaration by the WEU Member States, will make a 
fundamental contribution to solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance. The WEU 
will thus become the defence component of the European Union, at least for 
a transitional period. 
2. The Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security urges that the WEU should be 
fully assimilated into the European Union not later than 1998, when the WEU 
Treaty comes up for renewal. A start must be made on achieving that 
objective at the Inter-Governmental Conference scheduled for 1996. 
3. The Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security calls for the WEU reforms 
approved by the WEU Ministers at Petersberg (19 June 1992) and in Maastricht 
to be implemented consistently and without delay. They should include 
establishing a WEU military planning staff charged with complementing the 
efforts of the North Atlantic Alliance by pushing ahead, in close 
coordination with that organization, with military cooperation on logistics, 
transport, training and strategic reconnaissance. Meetings of Chiefs of 
Staff of WEU Member States should be held regularly and where necessary ad 
hoc. Armaments cooperation should be strengthened by setting up a European 
armaments agency. 
4. The fact that since November 1992 all EC Member States belong to the WEU 
either as full members or as observers is essentially welcome; problems are 
nevertheless posed by the fact that the observer status assumed by Denmark 
and Ireland could tend to inhibit full participation by those two countries 
in CFSP activities. 
5. The Petersberg decisions should be implemented immediately in the following 
areas: 
- humanitarian missions and rescue operations; 
- peace-keeping duties; 
- anti-crisis operations, including actions to restore peace. 
6. The Franco-German Corps (Eurocorps) approved in May 1992 by President 
Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl has the potential, given participation by 
other WEU Member States, to become an important factor in European 
integration and thus to function as a major operational component of European 
security in coordination with the Atlantic Alliance. The Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and Security welcomes in this connection Belgium's decision 
to participate in the Eurocorps and would welcome it if other Member States 
were to follow suit. The creation of combined France-Hispano-Italian 
airborne naval forces with the intention of helping to raise the profile of 
European security in the South of Europe, also points the way forward. 
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7. The European Community/European Union and WEU must create mechanisms for 
dialogue and cooperation on security matters, in particular with the EFTA 
States applying for membership, the Visegrad countries and the Baltic 
republics which have to be progressively incorporated into European 
unification policy. The process must be accelerated so as to strengthen the 
security of new democracies in the area formerly under Soviet domination. 
8. The CSCE and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council established by NATO 
provide appropriate forums for security policy cooperation with the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe and with the republics of the former Soviet 
Union. As integration progresses, the European Community/European Union must 
contribute to the United Nations, the CSCE and the Atlantic Alliance in line 
with its growing responsibilities. Account must be taken here of the 
increasing responsibility of the United Nations and the CSCE for security 
matters as well as NATO's continuing role with regard to security policy and 
operations. 
9. Even with ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and its implementation, the 
process of European unification will still be far from complete, nor will 
European Union thereby be concluded. The Common Foreign and Security Policy 
must not be confined to mere inter-governmental cooperation in the long term 
but must be raised to the status of a full Community policy subject to 
majority decision-making. It is there that the European Parliament must be 
allowed to exercise substantive powers of participation and supervision. 
The Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security calls on the Committee on 
Institutional Affairs to consider the above points when it next discusses its 
report. 
The Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security also takes the view that, pending 
full integration of the WEU into the political system of the EC, more detailed 
arrangements should be made for stepping up cooperation between the bodies of 
the WEU and the institutions of the EC than are called for in the draft report 
by the Committee on Institutional Affairs. In particular the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and Security would propose the following amendments: 
New paragraph. after paragraph 17: 
Expects associate members and states with observer status at the WEU to respect 
international law and UN resolutions and refrain from acts or omissions 
inconsistent with the legitimate rights and concerns of WEU members so as not 
to jeopardize the community spirit and functioning of the WEU; 
Paragraph 22 (Council) to be expanded as follows: 
New indent after the first indent: 
- representatives of the WEU Council should be regularly invited to report on 
its activities to the committee of the European Parliament responsible for 
security and defence matters; 
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Paragraph 23 (European Parliament> to be amended as follows; 
First indent (new): 
- The European Parliament should draw up its own proposals on security and 
defence policy and scrutinize the relevant decisions of the WEU Council. 
Second indent (new): 
- The European Parliament may address questions and recommendations to the WEU 
Council; 
Third and fourth indents (De Gucht) to be deleted. 
New indent after the fourth indent (De Gucht): 
The European Parliament should, in accordance with the mandate given in the 
Declaration on Western European Union annexed to the Treaty on European 
Union, pursue closer cooperation with the bodies of the WEU, in particular 
its Parliamentary Assembly. This should include the following practical 
measures: 
(a) Reciprocal ad hoc invitations to rapporteurs at committee and sub-
committee level to discuss reports on related subjects; 
(b) Annual joint meetings of the committees of the European Parliament and 
the WEU Parliamentary Assembly responsible for security and defence 
matters in order to coordinate activities and exchange information; 
(c) Creation of an interparliamentary delegation for relations with the WEU 
Assembly, the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA) and the CSCE Assembly. This 
delegation should as far as possible be drawn from members of the 
committee responsible for security and defence matters. Delegation 
members would as far as possible attend the half-yearly meetings of the 
WEU Assembly and the NAA and the annual meeting of the CSCE Assembly as 
observers with the right to speak. Conversely, representatives of these 
assemblies would be invited, under arrangements similar to those 
applicable to representatives of the Commission and Council, to follow 
the proceedings of the committee responsible for safety and defence 
matters; 
(d) Stepping up cooperation at secretariat level, including automatic 
exchanges of working and session documents. 
Followed by a further new indent: 
- Given that security and defence will continue to grow in importance as a 
subject to which the European Union must address itself, the European 
Parliament should be equipped with adequate administrative support to deal 
with these matters. 
DOC_EN\RR\244\244915 - 52 - PE 202.482/fin. 
J 
' 
